Awesome-offsec-claude code-review-analyst

Perform exploit-oriented code review by proving attacker-controlled paths from source to sink and validating impact.

install
source · Clone the upstream repo
git clone https://github.com/1ikeadragon/awesome-offsec-claude
Claude Code · Install into ~/.claude/skills/
T=$(mktemp -d) && git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/1ikeadragon/awesome-offsec-claude "$T" && mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills && cp -r "$T/code-review-analyst" ~/.claude/skills/1ikeadragon-awesome-offsec-claude-code-review-analyst && rm -rf "$T"
manifest: code-review-analyst/SKILL.md
source content

Code Review Analyst

Purpose

Produce high-confidence, exploitable code findings using source-to-sink proof.

Inputs

  • code_path
  • priority_trace_paths
  • recon_context
  • runtime_assumptions

Analysis Rules

  • No sink-only findings.
  • No framework-trust assumptions without verification.
  • No severity claims without exploitability context.

Workflow

Phase 1: Trace Construction

  1. Follow untrusted input through transformations.
  2. Confirm boundary checks at each transition.
  3. Identify bypass opportunities.

Phase 2: Exploitability Validation

  1. Verify attacker control over critical parameters.
  2. Verify sink reachability under realistic control flow.
  3. Build exploit narrative with prerequisites.

Phase 3: Vulnerability Class Testing

  1. Injection and query/command/template abuse.
  2. Access-control bypass (IDOR/BOLA/BFLA).
  3. Mass assignment and object property abuse.
  4. Path traversal and file handling flaws.
  5. Deserialization and parser confusion.
  6. Workflow and race-condition vulnerabilities.

Phase 4: Impact Assessment

  1. Data exposure and integrity damage potential.
  2. Privilege escalation and lateral movement potential.
  3. Blast radius and tenant isolation impact.

Phase 5: Reporting

  1. Provide concise exploit narrative.
  2. Provide precise root-cause location.
  3. Provide remediation direction tied to trust boundary.

Required Evidence per Finding

  • Source location and attacker input path.
  • Sink location and dangerous operation.
  • Missing/insufficient control explanation.
  • Reproduction logic and impact statement.

Output Contract

{
  "confirmed_findings": [],
  "exploit_paths": [],
  "impact_assessment": [],
  "remediation_notes": [],
  "confidence": []
}

Failure Modes

  • Treating dead code as reachable.
  • Confusing validation with authorization.
  • Missing multi-step state dependencies.

Quality Checklist

  • Source-to-sink chain is complete.
  • Reachability is justified.
  • Impact is realistic and bounded.

Detailed Operator Notes

Cross-Layer Trace Requirements

  • Include controller, service, data access, and sink layers.
  • Include serialization/deserialization boundary handling.
  • Include async boundaries (queue/job/event) where data crosses trust zones.

Access-Control Audit Rules

  • Verify policy check location relative to resource fetch.
  • Verify policy check occurs on every variant path.
  • Verify tenant scoping is enforced at data query layer.

Sanitization Audit Rules

  • Context-match sanitizer to sink type.
  • Confirm canonicalization happens before validation.
  • Check for alternate branch paths that skip sanitizer.

Reporting Rules

  • Include function-level path with file and symbol names.
  • Include bypass narrative for missing or weak control.
  • Include a precise fix location and test recommendation.

Quick Scenarios

Scenario A: Access Check Placement

  • Trace data fetch point.
  • Trace policy check point.
  • Determine whether check occurs before use.
  • Identify alternate path without check.

Scenario B: Sanitization Mismatch

  • Map sink execution context.
  • Map sanitizer type and location.
  • Validate context compatibility.
  • Find branch that bypasses sanitizer.

Scenario C: Adjacent Pattern Sweep

  • Identify sibling handlers/sinks.
  • Compare guard and validation parity.
  • Flag inconsistent control patterns.
  • Prioritize high-impact siblings.

Conditional Decision Matrix

ConditionActionEvidence Requirement
Source passes through helper wrappersinline helper logic into tracewrapper-expanded path
Policy check exists after data fetchtest prefetch exposure and side-effectsorder-of-operations trace
Sanitizer exists but context mismatchcraft context-correct exploit hypothesissink-context mismatch proof
Async boundary carries tainted datatrace serialization and consumer validationproducer-consumer trace
Sibling route has weaker guardsrun parity scan across sibling handlersguard parity matrix

Advanced Coverage Extensions

  1. Compare DTO/schema validation between create and update paths.
  2. Scan migration scripts and admin tasks for latent unsafe operations.
  3. Validate cache-layer authorization consistency.
  4. Validate feature-flagged code paths for missing controls.
  5. Validate error handling paths for secret leakage.