FreeBSD ptrace RFI and vm_map PROT_EXEC Bypass

A practical guide for usermode process injection on FreeBSD-based systems (including PS5) when you have kernel read/write primitives.

What This Skill Does

This skill helps you:

• Patch process credentials to enable ptrace/mdbg debugging authority
• Discover target processes via kernel allproc list traversal
• Bypass PROT_EXEC restrictions by modifying vm_map entries in kernel memory
• Perform Remote Function Invocation (RFI) using ptrace to call functions inside target processes
• Load and execute arbitrary ELF payloads in target processes
• Cleanly detach after payload execution

Prerequisites

Required:

• Kernel read/write primitives (from an exploit chain)
• Knowledge of target firmware/kernel version (offsets are version-specific)
• Access to target system (local or network)

Assumptions:

• You already have kernel R/W capabilities
• Target is FreeBSD-based (PS5, FreeBSD derivatives)
• Hypervisor allows data-only kernel writes (no CR0.WP/CR4.SMEP modifications)

Core Workflow

Step 1: Process Discovery via allproc

FreeBSD maintains a doubly-linked list of processes in kernel

.data

at

allproc

. Use your kernel read primitive to iterate it:

struct proc* find_proc_by_name(const char* proc_name) {
    uint64_t next = 0;
    kernel_copyout(KERNEL_ADDRESS_ALLPROC, &next, sizeof(uint64_t));
    struct proc* proc = malloc(sizeof(struct proc));
    
    do {
        kernel_copyout(next, (void*)proc, sizeof(struct proc));
        if (!strcmp(proc->p_comm, proc_name)) return proc;
        kernel_copyout(next, &next, sizeof(uint64_t));
    } while (next);
    
    free(proc);
    return NULL;
}

Key points:

• KERNEL_ADDRESS_ALLPROC

  is firmware-dependent

• p_comm

  is a fixed-size process name field
• Consider PID-based lookups if name matching is unreliable

Step 2: Elevate Credentials for Debugging

On PS5,

struct ucred

includes an Authority ID field. Writing the debugger Authority ID grants ptrace/mdbg over other processes:

void set_ucred_to_debugger() {
    struct proc* proc = get_proc_by_pid(getpid());
    if (proc) {
        uintptr_t ptrace_authid = 0x4800000000010003ULL; // debugger Authority ID
        kernel_copyin(&ptrace_authid, (uintptr_t)proc->p_ucred + 0x58, sizeof(uintptr_t));
        free(proc);
    }
}

Important:

• Offset

  0x58

  is PS5 firmware-specific; verify per version
• After this write, your injector can attach to user processes via ptrace/mdbg

Step 3: Bypass PROT_EXEC via vm_map Modification

Userland

mmap

may be constrained to

PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE

. FreeBSD tracks address space in

vm_map

entries. Modify kernel-owned metadata to add execute permission:

struct vm_map_entry {
    struct vm_map_entry *prev, *next, *left, *right;
    vm_offset_t start, end, avail_ssize;
    vm_size_t adj_free, max_free;
    union vm_map_object object;
    vm_ooffset_t offset;
    vm_eflags_t eflags;
    vm_prot_t protection;      // <-- Modify this
    vm_prot_t max_protection;  // <-- And this if needed
    vm_inherit_t inheritance;
    int wired_count;
    vm_pindex_t lastr;
};

Implementation approach:

1. Locate the target's

   vm_map

   structure
2. Walk entries (linear via

   next

   or BST via

   left/right

   for O(log n))
3. Find the entry covering your RW region
4. Set

   entry->protection |= PROT_EXEC

5. Optionally set

   entry->max_protection |= PROT_EXEC

This bypasses userland mmap policy by editing kernel metadata directly.

Step 4: Remote Function Invocation (RFI)

FreeBSD lacks Windows-style

VirtualAllocEx

/

CreateRemoteThread

. Instead, drive the target to call functions on itself under ptrace control:

RFI Sequence:

1. Attach to target process (

   PTRACE_ATTACH

   or PS5-specific mdbg)
2. Select a thread and save its context (registers, PC, SP, flags)
3. Write argument registers per ABI (x86_64 SysV or arm64 AAPCS64)
4. Set PC to target function address
5. Single-step or continue until controlled stop (breakpoint/signal)
6. Read return values from registers
7. Restore original context and continue

Example - Calling ELF loader:

intptr_t entry = elfldr_load(target_pid, (uint8_t*)elf_in_target);
intptr_t args  = elfldr_payload_args(target_pid);
printf("[+] ELF entrypoint: %#02lx\n[+] Payload Args: %#02lx\n", entry, args);

The loader maps segments, resolves imports, applies relocations, and returns:

• Entry point (often CRT bootstrap)
• Opaque

  payload_args

  pointer for your stager

Step 5: Threaded Stager and Clean Detach

Create a minimal stager that spawns a pthread for your payload, then triggers a breakpoint for clean detach:

int __attribute__((section(".stager_shellcode$1"))) stager(SCEFunctions* functions) {
    pthread_t thread;
    functions->pthread_create_ptr(&thread, 0,
        (void*(*)(void*))functions->elf_main, functions->payload_args);
    asm("int3");
    return 0;
}

Key points:

• SCEFunctions

  /

  payload_args

  provided by loader/SDK glue
• After breakpoint and detach, payload continues in its own thread
• This prevents deadlock and allows clean injector exit

End-to-End Pipeline

A working implementation typically includes:

Injector Server (NineS example):

• Listens on TCP port (e.g., 9033)
• Receives header with target process name + ELF image
• Handles injection workflow

Client Script:

python3 ./send_injection_elf.py SceShellUI hello_world.elf <PS5_IP>

Hello-world payload:

#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <ps5/klog.h>

int main() {
    klog_printf("Hello from PID %d\n", getpid());
    return 0;
}

Practical Considerations

Firmware-Specific Offsets

• allproc

  address

• ucred

  authority offset

• vm_map

  layout
• ptrace/mdbg details

Always verify offsets per firmware version.

Hypervisor Protections

• XOM (execute-only

  .text

  ) prevents reading/writing kernel code
• Clearing CR0.WP or disabling CR4.SMEP causes vmexit (crash)
• Only data-only kernel writes are viable

Alternative: JIT Memory

Some processes expose PS5 JIT APIs to allocate executable pages. The vm_map protection flip removes the need to rely on JIT/mirroring tricks.

Robustness

• Keep register save/restore robust
• On failure, you can deadlock or crash the target
• Test thoroughly before production use

Public Tooling

Tool	Purpose	Repository
PS5 SDK	Dynamic linking, kernel R/W wrappers, vm_map helpers	https://github.com/ps5-payload-dev/sdk
elfldr	ELF loader for injection	https://github.com/ps5-payload-dev/elfldr
NineS	Injector server	https://github.com/buzzer-re/NineS/
playstation_research_utils	Utilities/vm_map helpers	https://github.com/buzzer-re/playstation_research_utils
Mira	Related project	https://github.com/OpenOrbis/mira-project
gdbsrv	GDB server	https://github.com/ps5-payload-dev/gdbsrv

References

• Usermode ELF injection on the PlayStation 5
• FreeBSD klog reference

When to Use This Skill

Use this skill when:

• You have kernel R/W primitives on FreeBSD/PS5 and need process injection
• You need to bypass PROT_EXEC restrictions on userland mappings
• You want to perform ptrace-based RFI on FreeBSD systems
• You're developing payloads for PS5 or FreeBSD-based systems
• You need to understand vm_map structure and protection bypass techniques
• You're working on post-exploitation after gaining kernel access

Common Pitfalls

1. Wrong offsets: Always verify structure offsets for your specific firmware/kernel version
2. Hypervisor violations: Don't attempt CR0.WP/CR4.SMEP modifications
3. Register corruption: Ensure robust save/restore in RFI sequences
4. Thread selection: Choose appropriate threads for injection (avoid critical system threads)
5. Memory layout: Verify your RW region exists before attempting PROT_EXEC flip