Hacktricks-skills integer-overflow-exploitation
How to identify, analyze, and exploit integer overflow and underflow vulnerabilities in C/C++, Rust, and Go code. Use this skill whenever the user mentions integer overflow, underflow, arithmetic bugs, size calculation vulnerabilities, heap overflow from integer issues, or wants to audit code for numeric type vulnerabilities. Also use when analyzing binary exploitation challenges involving arithmetic operations, buffer size calculations, or memory allocation based on user-controlled numeric input.
git clone https://github.com/abelrguezr/hacktricks-skills
skills/binary-exploitation/integer-overflow-and-underflow/SKILL.MDInteger Overflow & Underflow Exploitation
A comprehensive guide to identifying and exploiting integer overflow and underflow vulnerabilities in software.
When to Use This Skill
Use this skill when:
- Analyzing code for integer overflow/underflow vulnerabilities
- Exploiting buffer overflows caused by arithmetic bugs
- Auditing size calculations in memory allocation
- Working with binary exploitation challenges involving numeric types
- Testing Go code for silent integer wrapping
- Analyzing heap corruption from undersized allocations
Core Concepts
What is Integer Overflow?
Integer overflow occurs when an arithmetic operation produces a result that exceeds the maximum value representable by the data type, causing it to wrap around.
Key principle: The vulnerability arises from the size limitation of data types and how the system interprets the wrapped value.
Integer Type Limits
| Type | Size (bits) | Min Value | Max Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| int8_t | 8 | -128 | 127 |
| uint8_t | 8 | 0 | 255 |
| int16_t | 16 | -32,768 | 32,767 |
| uint16_t | 16 | 0 | 65,535 |
| int32_t | 32 | -2,147,483,648 | 2,147,483,647 |
| uint32_t | 32 | 0 | 4,294,967,295 |
| int64_t | 64 | -9,223,372,036,854,775,808 | 9,223,372,036,854,775,807 |
| uint64_t | 64 | 0 | 18,446,744,073,709,551,615 |
Note: On 64-bit systems:
short = int16_t, int = int32_t, long = int64_t
Vulnerability Patterns
Pattern 1: Truncation to Smaller Type
When a large calculation result is cast to a smaller type:
// Vulnerable: 64-bit product truncated to 32-bit size_t count = 4294967296; // 2^32 size_t elem_size = 1; uint32_t alloc_size = (uint32_t)(count * elem_size); // Becomes 0!
Exploitation: The allocation uses the truncated value (0 or small), but the copy uses the original large value, causing heap overflow.
Pattern 2: Signed to Unsigned Conversion
Negative signed values become large unsigned values:
int userInput = -1; unsigned int processed = (unsigned int)userInput; // 0xFFFFFFFF (4,294,967,295) if (processed > 1000) { // TRUE! -8 becomes huge unsigned // Dangerous code path }
Pattern 3: Underflow in Subtraction
Subtracting a larger value from a smaller unsigned value:
size_t total_len = 8; const size_t HEADER = 16; size_t payload_len = total_len - HEADER; // Underflows to huge number! // payload_len = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF8 (18,446,744,073,709,551,608)
Pattern 4: Alignment Rounding Wrap
Some allocators round up without re-checking overflow:
size_t total_size = alloc_size + extra; if (total_size % 8) total_size += (8 - total_size) % total_size; // Can wrap!
For values near
0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF9, the rounding addition wraps to a tiny value.
Exploitation Methodology
Step 1: Identify the Vulnerable Calculation
Look for:
- User-controlled values in arithmetic operations
- Type casts between signed/unsigned or different sizes
- Size calculations before memory allocation
- Subtraction operations on unsigned types
- Multiplication of user-controlled values
Step 2: Determine the Overflow/Underflow Point
Calculate what input causes the wrap:
- Overflow: Input that makes result > max value of type
- Underflow: Input that makes subtraction result < 0 (for unsigned)
Example: For 32-bit truncation, use
2^32 = 4294967296 to get 0.
Step 3: Map Memory Layout
Understand where the undersized buffer is relative to sensitive data:
struct session { int is_admin; // Target to flip 0 → 1 char note[64]; }; // Layout: [buffer][gap][session] // If buffer is undersized, overflow can reach session->is_admin
Step 4: Craft the Payload
- Calculate offset to the target field
- Fill padding with arbitrary bytes
- Write the exploit value (e.g.,
for little-endian 1)p32(1)
# Example: Offset 48 bytes, then write 1 to is_admin payload = b"A" * 48 + p32(1)
Step 5: Deliver and Verify
- Send the overflow-inducing parameters
- Send the payload that overflows the undersized buffer
- Verify the exploit succeeded (flag, privilege escalation, etc.)
Common Exploitation Scenarios
Scenario A: Heap Overflow via Undersized Allocation
Vulnerability:
uint32_t alloc32 = (uint32_t)(count * elem_size) + 32; char *buf = malloc(alloc32); read(buf, count * elem_size); // Uses full size_t product!
Exploit:
- Set
(2^32),count = 4294967296elem_size = 1
bytes allocatedalloc32 = 0 + 32 = 32
tries to readread()
bytes4294967296- Overflow the 32-byte buffer to corrupt adjacent memory
Scenario B: Underflow Leading to Oversized Copy
Vulnerability:
size_t payload_len = total_len - HEADER; // Underflows if total_len < HEADER read(buf, payload_len); // Reads huge amount!
Exploit:
- Set
(less than HEADER = 16)total_len = 8
underflows topayload_len0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF8- Buffer allocated for 8 bytes, but read tries to copy huge amount
- Overflow corrupts adjacent structures
Scenario C: Signed/Unsigned Comparison Bypass
Vulnerability:
int length = get_user_input(); if (length < MAX_SIZE) { // -1 < MAX_SIZE is TRUE unsigned int ulength = (unsigned int)length; // -1 becomes huge process_buffer(ulength); // Processes huge buffer! }
Exploit:
- Send negative value (e.g., -1)
- Passes the signed comparison check
- Becomes large unsigned value in actual processing
- Triggers buffer overflow or resource exhaustion
Detection and Testing
Manual Code Review Checklist
- User input used in arithmetic without validation
- Type casts between signed/unsigned
- Type casts between different sizes (64→32, 32→16)
- Subtraction on unsigned types
- Multiplication of user-controlled values
- Size calculations before
/malloc
/callocrealloc - Array indexing with user-controlled values
- Loop counters from user input
Automated Detection
Use the provided scripts:
# Analyze C/C++ code for potential overflow vulnerabilities python scripts/analyze_overflow.py <source_file.c> # Generate test cases for specific overflow patterns python scripts/generate_overflow_tests.py --pattern truncation --type uint32
Go-Specific: go-panikint
Go silently wraps integers. Use go-panikint to detect overflows:
git clone https://github.com/trailofbits/go-panikint cd go-panikint/src && ./make.bash export GOROOT=/path/to/go-panikint ./bin/go test -fuzz=FuzzOverflowHarness
This turns silent wraps into panics with stack traces.
Mitigation Strategies
For Developers
-
Use safe arithmetic libraries:
- C:
,__builtin_mul_overflow()__builtin_add_overflow() - Rust:
,checked_add()
orchecked_mul()
variantssaturating_*
- C:
-
Validate before calculation:
if (count > SIZE_MAX / elem_size) return ERROR; // Prevent overflow size_t total = count * elem_size; -
Use consistent signedness:
- Don't mix signed and unsigned in comparisons
- Be explicit about type conversions
-
Enable compiler warnings:
gcc -Woverflow -Wsign-compare -Wtype-limits clang -fsanitize=integer
For Security Auditors
- Focus on allocation paths: Memory allocation based on user input is high-risk
- Check API boundaries: Where user input enters the system
- Review custom allocators: Often have subtle rounding bugs
- Test edge cases: 0, 1, MAX, MAX+1, -1, -2
ARM64 Considerations
Integer overflow behavior does not change on ARM64. The same exploitation patterns apply:
- Same type sizes and limits
- Same wrapping behavior
- Same heap exploitation techniques
The main difference is the calling convention and register usage, not the arithmetic behavior.
Real-World Examples
CVE-2025-54957: Pixel 0-click
Dolby Unified Decoder had an allocator rounding bug:
- Attacker-controlled
decoded with unbounded loopemdf_payload_size - Rounding to 8-byte alignment wrapped for values near
0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF9 - Result: Tiny allocation, huge write → heap overflow
Go Cosmos SDK Pagination
end := pageRequest.Offset + pageRequest.Limit wrapped past MaxUint64, returning empty results instead of proper pagination.
Quick Reference
Overflow Triggers
| Operation | Trigger Value | Result |
|---|---|---|
| uint8 + 1 | 255 | 0 |
| uint16 + 1 | 65,535 | 0 |
| uint32 + 1 | 4,294,967,295 | 0 |
| uint32 * 2 | 2,147,483,648 | 0 (if result > 2^32) |
| uint32 cast | 4,294,967,296 | 0 |
Underflow Triggers
| Operation | Trigger | Result |
|---|---|---|
| uint32 - 1 | 0 | 4,294,967,295 |
| uint32 - N | N-1 | 4,294,967,296 - N |
| uint64 - 1 | 0 | 18,446,744,073,709,551,615 |
Exploit Template
from pwn import * def exploit_overflow(): io = process("./vulnerable_binary") # 1. Send overflow-inducing parameters io.sendlineafter(b"count: ", b"4294967296") # 2^32 → 0 in uint32 io.sendlineafter(b"size: ", b"1") # 2. Wait for read io.recvuntil(b"Send payload") # 3. Craft payload: padding + exploit value payload = b"A" * OFFSET + p64(0x4141414141414141) # Adjust offset and value # 4. Send and close io.send(payload) io.shutdown("send") # Send EOF # 5. Read result print(io.recvall().decode())
Next Steps
- Analyze code: Use
to find potential vulnerabilitiesscripts/analyze_overflow.py - Generate tests: Use
to create test casesscripts/generate_overflow_tests.py - Build exploit: Follow the methodology above to craft your exploit
- Test iteratively: Adjust offsets and values based on results
For complex cases, examine the memory layout carefully and use debugging tools (gdb, lldb) to verify your understanding before crafting the final exploit.