Skills desktop-framework-electron

Electron process architecture, IPC patterns, preload security, native APIs, packaging and distribution

install
source · Clone the upstream repo
git clone https://github.com/agents-inc/skills
Claude Code · Install into ~/.claude/skills/
T=$(mktemp -d) && git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/agents-inc/skills "$T" && mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills && cp -r "$T/dist/plugins/desktop-framework-electron/skills/desktop-framework-electron" ~/.claude/skills/agents-inc-skills-desktop-framework-electron && rm -rf "$T"
manifest: dist/plugins/desktop-framework-electron/skills/desktop-framework-electron/SKILL.md
source content

Electron Desktop Applications

Quick Guide: Electron apps run two process types: a main process (Node.js, manages windows and system APIs) and renderer processes (Chromium, one per window). All communication between them flows through IPC via a preload script that uses

contextBridge
to expose a minimal, typed API surface. Never disable
contextIsolation
. Never enable
nodeIntegration
in renderers. Package with Electron Forge or Electron Builder. Auto-update via
autoUpdater
(Squirrel on macOS/Windows) or
electron-updater
for all platforms.


<critical_requirements>

CRITICAL: Before Using This Skill

All code must follow project conventions in CLAUDE.md (kebab-case, named exports, import ordering,

import type
, named constants)

(You MUST keep

contextIsolation: true
(the default) -- disabling it exposes the entire preload scope to untrusted renderer code)

(You MUST use

contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld()
in preload scripts -- never expose
ipcRenderer
directly)

(You MUST NOT enable

nodeIntegration: true
in any BrowserWindow -- it gives renderers full Node.js access, which is a critical security vulnerability)

(You MUST validate and sanitize ALL data received via IPC in the main process -- treat renderer messages as untrusted input)

(You MUST use

ipcMain.handle()
/
ipcRenderer.invoke()
for request-response IPC -- avoid
sendSync
which blocks the renderer)

(You MUST NOT load remote URLs with

nodeIntegration
or disabled
contextIsolation
-- this is equivalent to giving the remote site full system access)

</critical_requirements>


Auto-detection: Electron, electron, BrowserWindow, ipcMain, ipcRenderer, contextBridge, preload, webPreferences, electron-builder, electron-forge, app.whenReady, electronAPI, mainWindow, autoUpdater, nativeTheme, safeStorage, Tray, Menu, dialog, protocol, shell

When to use:

  • Building cross-platform desktop applications
  • Configuring main process / renderer process architecture
  • Setting up secure IPC communication patterns
  • Integrating with native OS features (tray, menus, dialogs, notifications, file system)
  • Packaging and distributing desktop applications
  • Implementing auto-update functionality
  • Registering custom protocol handlers / deep links

When NOT to use:

  • Choosing a UI framework for the renderer (use the appropriate web framework skill)
  • Styling the renderer UI (use the appropriate styling skill)
  • Server-side or backend logic not related to the main process
  • Mobile applications (Electron is desktop-only)
  • CLI tools that do not need a GUI

<patterns>

Key Patterns

Pattern 1: Secure BrowserWindow Creation

Every BrowserWindow must use a preload script and rely on the secure defaults:

contextIsolation: true
,
sandbox: true
,
nodeIntegration: false
.

const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
  width: 1200,
  height: 800,
  webPreferences: {
    preload: path.join(__dirname, "preload.js"),
    // contextIsolation: true  -- default since Electron 12
    // sandbox: true           -- default since Electron 20
    // nodeIntegration: false  -- default since Electron 5
  },
});

Key point: Never override the security defaults. The preload script is the ONLY bridge between main and renderer. See examples/core.md.


Pattern 2: Preload with contextBridge

The preload script exposes a narrow, explicitly typed API to the renderer. Never expose

ipcRenderer
directly.

// preload.js
const { contextBridge, ipcRenderer } = require("electron");

contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld("electronAPI", {
  readFile: (filePath) => ipcRenderer.invoke("read-file", filePath),
  onUpdateAvailable: (callback) => {
    ipcRenderer.on("update-available", (_event, data) => callback(data));
  },
});

Key point: Each exposed method wraps a single IPC channel. The renderer calls

window.electronAPI.readFile(path)
with no knowledge of IPC internals. See examples/core.md.


Pattern 3: IPC Request-Response (invoke/handle)

Use

ipcMain.handle()
in main and
ipcRenderer.invoke()
in preload for async two-way communication.

// main process
ipcMain.handle("read-file", async (_event, filePath) => {
  const content = await fs.readFile(filePath, "utf-8");
  return { success: true, content };
});

Key point:

handle
/
invoke
returns a Promise. Always validate
filePath
in the handler -- never trust renderer input. See examples/ipc.md for all IPC patterns.


Pattern 4: Main-to-Renderer Messages

Use

webContents.send()
from main and listen in the preload with a callback pattern.

// main: send to specific window
mainWindow.webContents.send("update-progress", { percent: 45 });

// preload: expose listener
onUpdateProgress: (callback) => {
  ipcRenderer.on("update-progress", (_event, data) => callback(data));
},

Key point: The renderer cannot pull from main -- main must push. Always scope listeners to specific channels. See examples/ipc.md.


Pattern 5: App Lifecycle

The main process manages the app lifecycle with platform-specific conventions.

app.whenReady().then(() => {
  createWindow();
  app.on("activate", () => {
    if (BrowserWindow.getAllWindows().length === 0) createWindow();
  });
});

app.on("window-all-closed", () => {
  if (process.platform !== "darwin") app.quit();
});

Key point: macOS apps stay alive when all windows close (

window-all-closed
should not quit). The
activate
event recreates a window when the dock icon is clicked. See examples/core.md.


Pattern 6: Native OS Integration

Electron exposes native APIs for dialogs, menus, tray icons, notifications, and more -- all accessed from the main process.

const { dialog } = require("electron");

const result = await dialog.showOpenDialog(mainWindow, {
  properties: ["openFile", "multiSelections"],
  filters: [{ name: "Documents", extensions: ["txt", "md", "json"] }],
});

Key point: Native dialogs are modal to a window when passed

mainWindow
as the first argument. See examples/native-apis.md.


Pattern 7: Custom Protocol / Deep Linking

Register your app to handle

myapp://
URLs for deep linking from browsers or other apps.

if (process.defaultApp) {
  app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient("myapp", process.execPath, [
    path.resolve(process.argv[1]),
  ]);
} else {
  app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient("myapp");
}

Key point: In development (

process.defaultApp
is true), you must pass the script path as an argument. On macOS, handle the
open-url
event on the
app
object. On Windows/Linux, handle via
second-instance
event. See examples/native-apis.md.

</patterns>

<decision_framework>

Decision Framework

IPC Pattern Selection

Which IPC pattern?
+-- Renderer needs a response from main?
|   +-- YES --> ipcMain.handle() + ipcRenderer.invoke()
+-- Renderer sends data, no response needed?
|   +-- YES --> ipcMain.on() + ipcRenderer.send()
+-- Main needs to push data to renderer?
|   +-- YES --> webContents.send() + ipcRenderer.on() (in preload)
+-- Two renderers need to communicate?
|   +-- YES --> Route through main process (never direct renderer-to-renderer)
+-- High-frequency data transfer (streaming)?
    +-- YES --> MessageChannelMain / MessagePort pair

Window Architecture

How many windows?
+-- Single window app?
|   +-- One BrowserWindow, one preload script
+-- Multi-window (e.g., preferences, about)?
|   +-- Separate BrowserWindow per view, each with its own preload
+-- Frameless / custom title bar?
|   +-- frame: false + custom drag regions via CSS (-webkit-app-region: drag)
+-- Persistent background work?
    +-- Use a hidden BrowserWindow or utilityProcess (Electron 22+)

</decision_framework>


Detailed resources:


<red_flags>

RED FLAGS

Critical Security Issues:

  • Disabling
    contextIsolation
    (
    contextIsolation: false
    ) -- exposes preload globals to renderer
  • Enabling
    nodeIntegration: true
    -- gives renderer full Node.js access (fs, child_process, etc.)
  • Exposing
    ipcRenderer
    directly via
    contextBridge
    instead of wrapping individual channels
  • Loading remote/untrusted URLs without
    sandbox: true
  • Disabling
    webSecurity
    in production (
    webSecurity: false
    disables same-origin policy)
  • Not validating IPC arguments in main process handlers (path traversal, injection attacks)
  • Using
    shell.openExternal()
    with unvalidated URLs (can execute arbitrary commands)

Architecture Issues:

  • Using
    ipcRenderer.sendSync()
    -- blocks the renderer process, causes UI freezes
  • Putting business logic in the renderer instead of the main process
  • Direct renderer-to-renderer communication (bypassing main)
  • Using
    remote
    module (removed in Electron 14+, was a security and performance hazard)
  • Creating BrowserWindows from the renderer process
  • Not handling
    window-all-closed
    per-platform (macOS apps should not quit)

Packaging Issues:

  • Shipping
    devDependencies
    in production builds (bloated app size)
  • Not code-signing the application (OS warnings, auto-update failures on macOS)
  • Bundling
    node_modules
    without pruning or using ASAR archive
  • Hardcoding absolute paths that differ between dev and packaged environments
  • Using
    __dirname
    in renderer code (unavailable in sandboxed renderers)

Common Mistakes:

  • Forgetting
    app.whenReady()
    -- APIs are unavailable before the
    ready
    event
  • Not re-creating window on
    activate
    event (macOS dock click does nothing)
  • Using
    require()
    in renderer scripts loaded via
    <script>
    tags (not available in sandboxed renderers)
  • Setting
    nodeIntegrationInSubFrames: true
    for iframes loading external content
  • Not setting proper
    Content-Security-Policy
    headers for renderer HTML

</red_flags>


<critical_reminders>

CRITICAL REMINDERS

All code must follow project conventions in CLAUDE.md (kebab-case, named exports, import ordering,

import type
, named constants)

(You MUST keep

contextIsolation: true
(the default) -- disabling it exposes the entire preload scope to untrusted renderer code)

(You MUST use

contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld()
in preload scripts -- never expose
ipcRenderer
directly)

(You MUST NOT enable

nodeIntegration: true
in any BrowserWindow -- it gives renderers full Node.js access, which is a critical security vulnerability)

(You MUST validate and sanitize ALL data received via IPC in the main process -- treat renderer messages as untrusted input)

(You MUST use

ipcMain.handle()
/
ipcRenderer.invoke()
for request-response IPC -- avoid
sendSync
which blocks the renderer)

Failure to follow these rules will create severe security vulnerabilities or broken desktop applications.

</critical_reminders>