Marketplace slb
Simultaneous Launch Button - Two-person rule for destructive commands in multi-agent workflows. Risk-tiered classification, command hash binding, 5 execution gates, client-side execution with environment inheritance. Go CLI.
git clone https://github.com/aiskillstore/marketplace
T=$(mktemp -d) && git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/aiskillstore/marketplace "$T" && mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills && cp -r "$T/skills/dicklesworthstone/slb" ~/.claude/skills/aiskillstore-marketplace-slb && rm -rf "$T"
skills/dicklesworthstone/slb/SKILL.mdSLB — Simultaneous Launch Button
A Go CLI that implements a two-person rule for running potentially destructive commands from AI coding agents. When an agent wants to run something risky (e.g.,
rm -rf, git push --force, kubectl delete, DROP TABLE), SLB requires peer review and explicit approval before execution.
Why This Exists
Coding agents can get tunnel vision, hallucinate, or misunderstand context. A second reviewer (ideally with a different model/tooling) catches mistakes before they become irreversible.
SLB is built for multi-agent workflows where many agent terminals run in parallel and a single bad command could destroy work, data, or infrastructure.
Critical Design: Client-Side Execution
Commands run in YOUR shell environment, not on a server. The daemon is a NOTARY (verifies approvals), not an executor. This means commands inherit:
- AWS_PROFILE, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID
- KUBECONFIG
- Activated virtualenvs
- SSH_AUTH_SOCK
- Database connection strings
Risk Tiers
| Tier | Approvals | Auto-approve | Examples |
|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | 2+ | Never | , , , |
| DANGEROUS | 1 | Never | , , , |
| CAUTION | 0 | After 30s | , , |
| SAFE | 0 | Immediately | , , |
Quick Start
Installation
# One-liner curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/slb/main/scripts/install.sh | bash # Or with go install go install github.com/Dicklesworthstone/slb/cmd/slb@latest
Initialize a Project
cd /path/to/project slb init
Creates
.slb/ directory with:
- SQLite database (source of truth)state.db
- Project configurationconfig.toml
- JSON files for pending requestspending/
- Execution logslogs/
Basic Workflow
# 1. Start a session (as an AI agent) slb session start --agent "GreenLake" --program "claude-code" --model "opus" # Returns: session_id and session_key # 2. Run a dangerous command (blocks until approved) slb run "rm -rf ./build" --reason "Clean build artifacts" --session-id <id> # 3. Another agent reviews and approves slb pending # See what's waiting slb review <request-id> # View full details slb approve <request-id> --session-id <reviewer-id> --comment "Looks safe" # 4. Original command executes automatically after approval
Commands Reference
Session Management
slb session start --agent <name> --program <prog> --model <model> slb session end --session-id <id> slb session resume --agent <name> --create-if-missing # Resume after crash slb session list # Show active sessions slb session heartbeat --session-id <id> # Keep session alive slb session gc --threshold 2h # Clean stale sessions
Request & Run
# Primary command (atomic: check, request, wait, execute) slb run "<command>" --reason "..." --session-id <id> # Plumbing commands slb request "<command>" --reason "..." # Create request only slb status <request-id> --wait # Check/wait for status slb pending --all-projects # List pending requests slb cancel <request-id> # Cancel own request
Review & Approve
slb review <request-id> # Show full details slb approve <request-id> --session-id <id> --comment "..." slb reject <request-id> --session-id <id> --reason "..."
Execution
slb execute <request-id> # Execute approved request slb emergency-execute "<cmd>" --reason "..." # Human override (logged) slb rollback <request-id> # Rollback if captured
Pattern Management
slb patterns list --tier critical # List patterns by tier slb patterns test "<command>" # Check what tier a command gets slb patterns add --tier dangerous "<pattern>" # Add runtime pattern
Daemon & TUI
slb daemon start --foreground # Start background daemon slb daemon stop # Stop daemon slb daemon status # Check daemon status slb tui # Launch interactive TUI slb watch --session-id <id> --json # Stream events (NDJSON)
Claude Code Hook
slb hook install # Install PreToolUse hook slb hook status # Check installation slb hook test "<command>" # Test classification slb hook uninstall # Remove hook
History & Audit
slb history --tier critical --status executed # Filter history slb history -q "rm -rf" # Full-text search slb show <request-id> --with-reviews # Detailed view slb outcome record <request-id> --problems # Record feedback slb outcome stats # Execution statistics
Pattern Matching Engine
Classification Algorithm
-
Normalization: Commands are parsed with shell-aware tokenization
- Strips wrapper prefixes:
,sudo
,doas
,env
,timenohup - Extracts inner commands from
bash -c 'command' - Resolves paths:
→./foo/absolute/path/foo
- Strips wrapper prefixes:
-
Compound Command Handling: Commands with
,;
,&&
,||
are split and each segment classified. Highest risk segment wins:|echo "done" && rm -rf /etc → CRITICAL (rm -rf /etc wins) ls && git status → SAFE (no dangerous patterns) -
Shell-Aware Splitting: Separators inside quotes preserved:
psql -c "DELETE FROM users; DROP TABLE x;" → Single segment (SQL) echo "foo" && rm -rf /tmp → Two segments -
Pattern Precedence: SAFE → CRITICAL → DANGEROUS → CAUTION (first match wins)
-
Fail-Safe Parse Handling: If parsing fails, tier is upgraded by one level:
- SAFE → CAUTION
- CAUTION → DANGEROUS
- DANGEROUS → CRITICAL
Default Patterns
CRITICAL (2+ approvals):
rm -rf /..., DROP DATABASE/SCHEMA, TRUNCATE TABLE, terraform destroy, kubectl delete node/namespace/pv/pvc, git push --force, aws terminate-instances, dd ... of=/dev/
DANGEROUS (1 approval):
rm -rf, git reset --hard, git clean -fd, kubectl delete, terraform destroy -target, DROP TABLE, chmod -R, chown -R
CAUTION (auto-approved after 30s):
rm <file>, git stash drop, git branch -d, npm/pip uninstall
SAFE (skip review):
rm *.log, rm *.tmp, git stash, kubectl delete pod, npm cache clean
Request Lifecycle
State Machine
┌─────────────┐ │ PENDING │ └──────┬──────┘ ┌───────────────┼───────────────┐───────────────┐ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │ APPROVED │ │ REJECTED │ │ CANCELLED│ │ TIMEOUT │ └────┬─────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └────┬─────┘ │ (terminal) (terminal) │ ▼ ▼ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │EXECUTING │ │ESCALATED │ └────┬─────┘ └──────────┘ │ ┌──────┴──────┬──────────┐ ▼ ▼ ▼ ┌────────┐ ┌─────────┐ ┌────────┐ │EXECUTED│ │EXEC_FAIL│ │TIMED_OUT│ └────────┘ └─────────┘ └────────┘ (terminal) (terminal) (terminal)
Approval TTL
- Standard requests: 30 minutes (configurable)
- CRITICAL requests: 10 minutes (stricter)
If approval expires before execution, re-approval required.
Execution Verification (5 Security Gates)
Before any command executes, five gates must pass:
| Gate | Check |
|---|---|
| 1. Status | Request must be in APPROVED state |
| 2. Expiry | Approval TTL must not have elapsed |
| 3. Hash | SHA-256 hash of command must match (tamper detection) |
| 4. Tier | Risk tier must still match (patterns may have changed) |
| 5. First-Executor | Atomic claim prevents race conditions |
Dry Run & Rollback
Dry Run Pre-flight
For supported commands, SLB can run a dry-run variant first:
| Command | Dry-run variant |
|---|---|
| |
| |
| (show what would change) |
[general] enable_dry_run = true
Rollback State Capture
Before executing, SLB can capture state:
[general] enable_rollback_capture = true max_rollback_size_mb = 100
Captured state includes:
- Filesystem: Tar archive of affected paths
- Git: HEAD commit, branch, dirty state, untracked files
- Kubernetes: YAML manifests of affected resources
slb rollback <request-id> # Restore captured state slb rollback <request-id> --force # Force overwrite
Configuration
Configuration is hierarchical (lowest to highest priority):
- Built-in defaults
- User config (
)~/.slb/config.toml - Project config (
).slb/config.toml - Environment variables (
)SLB_* - Command-line flags
Example Configuration
[general] min_approvals = 2 request_timeout = 1800 # 30 minutes approval_ttl_minutes = 30 timeout_action = "escalate" # or "auto_reject", "auto_approve_warn" require_different_model = true # Reviewer must use different AI model [rate_limits] max_pending_per_session = 5 max_requests_per_minute = 10 [notifications] desktop_enabled = true webhook_url = "https://slack.com/webhook/..." [daemon] tcp_addr = "" # For Docker/remote agents tcp_require_auth = true [agents] trusted_self_approve = ["senior-agent"] trusted_self_approve_delay_seconds = 300
Advanced Configuration
Cross-Project Reviews
[general] cross_project_reviews = true review_pool = ["agent-a", "agent-b", "human-reviewer"]
Conflict Resolution
[general] conflict_resolution = "any_rejection_blocks" # Default # Options: any_rejection_blocks | first_wins | human_breaks_tie
Dynamic Quorum
[patterns.critical] dynamic_quorum = true dynamic_quorum_floor = 2 # Minimum approvals even with few reviewers
Daemon Architecture
IPC Communication
Unix domain sockets (project-specific):
/tmp/slb-<hash>.sock
JSON-RPC Protocol
All daemon communication uses JSON-RPC 2.0:
{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "hook_query", "params": {"command": "rm -rf /"}, "id": 1}
Available methods:
hook_query, hook_health, verify_execution, subscribe
TCP Mode (Docker/Remote)
[daemon] tcp_addr = "0.0.0.0:9876" tcp_require_auth = true tcp_allowed_ips = ["192.168.1.0/24"]
Timeout Handling
| Action | Behavior |
|---|---|
| Transition to ESCALATED, notify humans (default) |
| Automatically reject the request |
| Auto-approve CAUTION tier with warning |
Agent Event Streaming
slb watch provides real-time NDJSON event streaming:
slb watch --session-id <id>
{"type":"request_pending","request_id":"abc123","tier":"dangerous","command":"rm -rf ./build","ts":"..."} {"type":"request_approved","request_id":"abc123","reviewer":"BlueLake","ts":"..."} {"type":"request_executed","request_id":"abc123","exit_code":0,"ts":"..."}
Event types:
request_pending, request_approved, request_rejected, request_executed, request_timeout, request_cancelled
Auto-Approve Mode (for reviewer agents)
slb watch --session-id <id> --auto-approve-caution
Request Attachments
Provide context for reviewers:
# Attach file slb request "DROP TABLE users" --reason "..." --attach ./schema.sql # Attach screenshot slb request "kubectl delete deployment" --reason "..." --attach ./dashboard.png # Attach command output slb request "terraform destroy" --reason "..." --attach-cmd "terraform plan -destroy"
Emergency Override
For true emergencies, humans can bypass with extensive logging:
# Interactive (prompts for confirmation) slb emergency-execute "rm -rf /tmp/broken" --reason "System emergency: disk full" # Non-interactive (requires hash acknowledgment) HASH=$(echo -n "rm -rf /tmp/broken" | sha256sum | cut -d' ' -f1) slb emergency-execute "rm -rf /tmp/broken" --reason "Emergency" --yes --ack $HASH
Safeguards: Mandatory reason, hash acknowledgment, extensive logging, optional rollback capture.
Outcome Tracking
Record execution feedback to improve pattern classification:
slb outcome record <request-id> # Success slb outcome record <request-id> --problems --description "Deleted wrong files" slb outcome stats # Statistics
TUI Dashboard
slb tui
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ SLB Dashboard │ ├─────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ AGENTS │ PENDING REQUESTS │ │ ─────── │ ──────────────── │ │▸ GreenLake │▸ abc123 CRITICAL rm -rf /etc BlueLake 2m │ │ BlueLake │ def456 DANGEROUS git reset --hard GreenLake 5m │ ├─────────────────┴───────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ ACTIVITY │ │ 10:30:15 GreenLake approved abc123 │ │ 10:28:42 BlueLake requested def456 (DANGEROUS) │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Keys:
Tab (cycle panels), ↑/↓ (navigate), Enter (view), a (approve), r (reject), q (quit)
Claude Code Hook Integration
# Install hook slb hook install # Hook actions returned to Claude Code: # - allow: Command proceeds # - ask: User prompted (CAUTION tier) # - block: Blocked with message to use `slb request`
Generate IDE integrations:
slb integrations claude-hooks > ~/.claude/hooks.json slb integrations cursor-rules > .cursorrules
Security Design Principles
Defense in Depth (6 layers)
- Pattern-based classification
- Peer review requirement
- Command hash binding (SHA-256)
- Approval TTL
- Execution verification gates
- Audit logging
Cryptographic Guarantees
- Command binding: SHA-256 hash verified at execution
- Review signatures: HMAC using session keys
- Session keys: Generated per-session, never stored in plaintext
Fail-Closed Behavior
- Daemon unreachable → Block dangerous commands (hook)
- Parse error → Upgrade tier by one level
- Approval expired → Require new approval
- Hash mismatch → Reject execution
Exit Codes
| Code | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Success |
| General error |
| Invalid arguments |
| Request not found |
| Permission denied |
| Timeout |
| Rate limited |
Environment Variables
| Variable | Description |
|---|---|
| Minimum approval count |
| Request timeout in seconds |
| What to do on timeout |
| Enable desktop notifications |
| Webhook notification URL |
| TCP listen address |
| Comma-separated trusted agents |
Troubleshooting
"Daemon not running" warning
SLB works without daemon (file-based polling). Start for real-time:
slb daemon start
"Active session already exists"
slb session resume --agent "YourAgent" --create-if-missing
Approval expired
Re-request:
slb run "<command>" --reason "..."
Command hash mismatch
Command was modified after approval. Re-request for the modified command.
Safety Note
SLB adds friction and peer review for dangerous actions. It does NOT replace:
- Least-privilege credentials
- Environment safeguards
- Proper access controls
- Backup strategies
Use SLB as defense in depth, not your only protection.
Integration with Flywheel
| Tool | Integration |
|---|---|
| Agent Mail | Notify reviewers via inbox; track audit trails |
| BV | Track SLB requests as beads |
| CASS | Search past SLB decisions across sessions |
| DCG | DCG blocks automatically; SLB adds peer review layer |
| NTM | Coordinate review across agent terminals |