Claude-night-market supply-chain-advisory

'Supply chain security patterns for dependency management: known-bad version

install
source · Clone the upstream repo
git clone https://github.com/athola/claude-night-market
Claude Code · Install into ~/.claude/skills/
T=$(mktemp -d) && git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/athola/claude-night-market "$T" && mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills && cp -r "$T/plugins/leyline/skills/supply-chain-advisory" ~/.claude/skills/athola-claude-night-market-supply-chain-advisory && rm -rf "$T"
manifest: plugins/leyline/skills/supply-chain-advisory/SKILL.md
source content

Overview

Supply chain attacks bypass traditional code review by compromising upstream dependencies. This skill provides patterns for detecting, preventing, and responding to compromised packages in Python ecosystems.

When To Use

  • After a supply chain advisory is published
  • When auditing dependencies for a new or existing project
  • During incident response for a suspected compromise
  • When adding the SessionStart hook to a project

When NOT To Use

  • General CVE triage unrelated to dependency supply chain
  • Application-level vulnerability scanning (use a SAST tool)
  • License compliance audits (different concern)

Known-Bad Versions Blocklist

The blocklist lives at

${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/known-bad-versions.json
. It is consumed by:

  1. SessionStart hook — warns per-session when compromised versions detected
  2. make supply-chain-scan
    — CI/local scanning target
  3. This skill — manual audit guidance

Blocklist Format

{
  "package_name": [{
    "versions": ["x.y.z"],
    "date": "YYYY-MM-DD",
    "description": "What the attack did",
    "indicators": ["files or patterns to search for"],
    "source": "advisory URL",
    "severity": "critical|high|medium"
  }]
}

Adding a New Entry

  1. Add the entry to
    ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/known-bad-versions.json
  2. Add version exclusions (
    !=x.y.z
    ) to affected
    pyproject.toml
    files
  3. Document in
    docs/dependency-audit.md
    under Supply Chain Incidents
  4. Run
    make supply-chain-scan
    to verify detection works

Quick Scan Commands

Check all lockfiles on machine for known-bad versions

# Scan uv.lock files for a specific compromised version
grep -r "package_name.*version" --include="uv.lock" /path/to/projects

# Search for malicious artifacts
find /path/to/projects -name "suspicious_file.pth" 2>/dev/null

# Check installed versions in virtualenvs
find /path/to/projects -path "*/.venv/lib/*/PACKAGE*/METADATA" \
  -exec grep "^Version:" {} +

Verify lockfile hash integrity

uv.lock
includes SHA256 hashes for every package. If a package is re-published with different content under the same version,
uv sync
will fail with a hash mismatch. This is your strongest automatic defense.

Defense Layers

LayerToolCatches
Lockfile hashesuv.lock SHA256Tampered re-published versions
Version exclusionspyproject.toml
!=
Known-bad versions on fresh resolve
SessionStart hooksanctum hookPer-session warning for compromised deps
CI scanningOSV + SafetyCVE database + advisory matching
Artifact scanningmake supply-chain-scanMalicious files (.pth, scripts)

Limitations

  • Zero-day supply chain attacks have no prior advisory — lockfile hashes are the only automatic defense during the attack window
  • Safety/CVE databases lag behind real-world compromises
  • OSV provides broader coverage but is still reactive