Claude-code-plugins-plus linktree-security-basics

install
source · Clone the upstream repo
git clone https://github.com/jeremylongshore/claude-code-plugins-plus-skills
Claude Code · Install into ~/.claude/skills/
T=$(mktemp -d) && git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/jeremylongshore/claude-code-plugins-plus-skills "$T" && mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills && cp -r "$T/plugins/saas-packs/linktree-pack/skills/linktree-security-basics" ~/.claude/skills/jeremylongshore-claude-code-plugins-plus-linktree-security-basics && rm -rf "$T"
manifest: plugins/saas-packs/linktree-pack/skills/linktree-security-basics/SKILL.md
source content

Linktree Security Basics

Overview

Linktree integrations handle user-generated content (link titles, URLs, bios) and analytics data that is PII-adjacent — click counts, geographic breakdowns, and referrer URLs can fingerprint individual visitors. Bearer token authentication means a leaked key grants full account access including link creation, profile modification, and analytics export. Webhook payloads carry real-time event data signed with HMAC-SHA256, and failing to verify signatures opens your endpoint to spoofed events and data poisoning.

Prerequisites

  • Secrets manager (AWS SSM, GCP Secret Manager, or Vault) for all Linktree credentials
  • HTTPS enforced on all webhook receiver endpoints
  • .env
    files in
    .gitignore
    — never committed to version control
  • Logging infrastructure that supports field-level redaction

API Key Management

// Load Linktree bearer token from environment — never hardcode
const LINKTREE_TOKEN = process.env.LINKTREE_API_KEY;

function validateLinktreeConfig(): void {
  if (!LINKTREE_TOKEN || LINKTREE_TOKEN.startsWith('lt_test_')) {
    throw new Error('Missing or test-only LINKTREE_API_KEY — set a production token');
  }
}

function linktreeHeaders(): Record<string, string> {
  return {
    Authorization: `Bearer ${LINKTREE_TOKEN}`,
    'Content-Type': 'application/json',
  };
}
// Call validateLinktreeConfig() at startup, before accepting requests

Webhook Signature Verification

import crypto from 'node:crypto';

const WEBHOOK_SECRET = process.env.LINKTREE_WEBHOOK_SECRET!;

function verifyLinktreeWebhook(payload: string, signature: string): boolean {
  const expected = crypto
    .createHmac('sha256', WEBHOOK_SECRET)
    .update(payload, 'utf8')
    .digest('hex');
  // Timing-safe comparison prevents timing attacks
  return crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(signature), Buffer.from(expected));
}

// Express middleware
app.post('/webhooks/linktree', (req, res) => {
  const sig = req.headers['x-linktree-signature'] as string;
  if (!sig || !verifyLinktreeWebhook(JSON.stringify(req.body), sig)) {
    return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid signature' });
  }
  // Process verified event
});

Input Validation

import { URL } from 'node:url';

function sanitizeLinkTitle(title: string): string {
  // Strip HTML/script tags from user-generated link titles
  return title.replace(/<[^>]*>/g, '').trim().slice(0, 150);
}

function validateLinkUrl(url: string): boolean {
  try {
    const parsed = new URL(url);
    // Only allow http/https — block javascript:, data:, file: schemes
    return ['http:', 'https:'].includes(parsed.protocol);
  } catch {
    return false;
  }
}

Data Protection

function redactAnalytics(data: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown> {
  const sensitive = ['ip_address', 'user_agent', 'referrer_url', 'geo_city'];
  const redacted = { ...data };
  for (const field of sensitive) {
    if (redacted[field]) redacted[field] = '[REDACTED]';
  }
  return redacted;
}
// Use redactAnalytics() before writing any analytics payload to logs

Access Control

// Linktree tokens are account-scoped — enforce least privilege
function assertReadOnlyScope(operation: string): void {
  const writeOps = ['create_link', 'update_link', 'delete_link', 'update_profile'];
  if (writeOps.includes(operation) && process.env.LINKTREE_READ_ONLY === 'true') {
    throw new Error(`Write operation "${operation}" blocked in read-only mode`);
  }
}

Security Checklist

  • Bearer token stored in secrets manager, not
    .env
    on disk
  • Webhook
    x-linktree-signature
    verified with HMAC-SHA256
  • Link URLs validated against allowlisted protocols
  • Link titles sanitized for HTML/XSS before storage or display
  • Analytics data redacted before logging (IP, user-agent, geo)
  • Read-only mode enforced for non-admin integrations
  • Token rotation scheduled quarterly
  • Rate limiting applied to webhook receiver endpoint

Error Handling

VulnerabilityRiskMitigation
Bearer token in logsFull account takeoverRedact
Authorization
header in all log output
Unverified webhooksSpoofed link-click eventsReject any request missing valid
x-linktree-signature
Malicious link URLsOpen redirect / phishingValidate URL scheme and domain before storing
XSS in link titlesScript injection via UGCStrip HTML tags and enforce max length
Analytics PII leakageGDPR/CCPA violationRedact IP, geo, and referrer before persistence

Resources

Next Steps

See

linktree-prod-checklist
.