Paths: File paths (

shared/

,

references/

,

../ln-*

) are relative to skills repo root. If not found at CWD, locate this SKILL.md directory and go up one level for repo root. If

shared/

is missing, fetch files via WebFetch from

https://raw.githubusercontent.com/levnikolaevich/claude-code-skills/master/skills/{path}

.

Security Auditor (L3 Worker)

Type: L3 Worker

Specialized worker auditing security vulnerabilities in codebase.

Purpose & Scope

• Audit codebase for security vulnerabilities (Category 1: Critical Priority)
• Scan for hardcoded secrets, SQL injection, XSS, insecure dependencies, missing input validation
• Return structured findings to coordinator with severity, location, effort, recommendations
• Calculate compliance score (X/10) for Security category

Inputs

MANDATORY READ: Load

shared/references/audit_worker_core_contract.md

.

Receives

contextStore

with:

tech_stack

,

best_practices

,

principles

,

codebase_root

,

output_dir

.

Workflow

MANDATORY READ: Load

shared/references/two_layer_detection.md

for detection methodology.

1. Parse Context: Extract tech stack, best practices, codebase root, output_dir from contextStore
2. Scan Codebase (Layer 1): Run security checks using Glob/Grep patterns (see Audit Rules below)
3. Analyze Context (Layer 2): For each candidate, read surrounding code to classify:
   • Secrets: test fixture / example / template -> FP. Production code -> confirmed
   • SQL injection: ORM parameterization nearby -> FP. Raw string concat with user input -> confirmed
   • XSS: framework auto-escapes (React JSX, Go templates) -> FP. Unsafe context (

     innerHTML

     ,

     | safe

     ) -> confirmed
   • Deps: vulnerable API not called in project -> downgrade. Exploitable path -> confirmed
   • Validation: internal service-to-service endpoint -> downgrade. Public API -> confirmed
4. Collect Findings: Record confirmed violations with severity, location (file:line), effort estimate (S/M/L), recommendation
5. Calculate Score: Count violations by severity, calculate compliance score (X/10)
6. Write Report: Build full markdown report in memory per

   shared/templates/audit_worker_report_template.md

   , write to

   {output_dir}/ln-621--global.md

   in single Write call
7. Return Summary: Return minimal summary to coordinator (see Output Format)

Audit Rules (Priority: CRITICAL)

1. Hardcoded Secrets

What: API keys, passwords, tokens, private keys in source code

Detection:

• Search patterns:

  API_KEY = "..."

  ,

  password = "..."

  ,

  token = "..."

  ,

  SECRET = "..."

• File extensions:

  .ts

  ,

  .js

  ,

  .py

  ,

  .go

  ,

  .java

  ,

  .cs

• Exclude:

  .env.example

  ,

  README.md

  , test files with mock data

Severity:

• CRITICAL: Production credentials (AWS keys, database passwords, API tokens)
• HIGH: Development/staging credentials
• MEDIUM: Test credentials in non-test files

Recommendation: Move to environment variables (.env), use secret management (Vault, AWS Secrets Manager)

Effort: S (replace hardcoded value with

process.env.VAR_NAME

)

2. SQL Injection Patterns

What: String concatenation in SQL queries instead of parameterized queries

Detection:

• Patterns:

  query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id=" + userId

  ,

  db.execute(f"SELECT * FROM {table}")

  ,

  `SELECT * FROM ${table}`

• Languages: JavaScript, Python, PHP, Java

Severity:

• CRITICAL: User input directly concatenated without sanitization
• HIGH: Variable concatenation in production code
• MEDIUM: Concatenation with internal variables only

Recommendation: Use parameterized queries (prepared statements), ORM query builders

Effort: M (refactor query to use placeholders)

3. XSS Vulnerabilities

What: Unsanitized user input rendered in HTML/templates

Detection:

• Patterns:

  innerHTML = userInput

  ,

  dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{__html: data}}

  ,

  echo $userInput;

• Template engines: Check for unescaped output (

  {{ var | safe }}

  ,

  <%- var %>

  )

Severity:

• CRITICAL: User input directly inserted into DOM without sanitization
• HIGH: User input with partial sanitization (insufficient escaping)
• MEDIUM: Internal data with potential XSS if compromised

Recommendation: Use framework escaping (React auto-escapes, use

textContent

), sanitize with DOMPurify

Effort: S-M (replace

innerHTML

with

textContent

or sanitize)

4. Insecure Dependencies

What: Dependencies with known CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures)

Detection:

• Run

  npm audit

  (Node.js),

  pip-audit

  (Python),

  cargo audit

  (Rust),

  dotnet list package --vulnerable

  (.NET)
• Check for outdated critical dependencies

Severity:

• CRITICAL: CVE with exploitable vulnerability in production dependencies
• HIGH: CVE in dev dependencies or lower severity production CVEs
• MEDIUM: Outdated packages without known CVEs but security risk

Recommendation: Update to patched versions, replace unmaintained packages

Effort: S-M (update package.json, test), L (if breaking changes)

5. Missing Input Validation

What: Missing validation at system boundaries (API endpoints, user forms, file uploads)

Detection:

• API routes without validation middleware
• Form handlers without input sanitization
• File uploads without type/size checks
• Missing CORS configuration

Severity:

• CRITICAL: File upload without validation, authentication bypass potential
• HIGH: Missing validation on sensitive endpoints (payment, auth, user data)
• MEDIUM: Missing validation on read-only or internal endpoints

Recommendation: Add validation middleware (Joi, Yup, express-validator), implement input sanitization

Effort: M (add validation schema and middleware)

Scoring Algorithm

MANDATORY READ: Load

shared/references/audit_worker_core_contract.md

and

shared/references/audit_scoring.md

.

Output Format

MANDATORY READ: Load

shared/references/audit_worker_core_contract.md

and

shared/templates/audit_worker_report_template.md

.

Write JSON summary per

shared/references/audit_summary_contract.md

. In managed mode the caller passes both

runId

and

summaryArtifactPath

; in standalone mode the worker generates its own run-scoped artifact path per shared contract.

Write report to

{output_dir}/ln-621--global.md

with

category: "Security"

and checks: hardcoded_secrets, sql_injection, xss_vulnerabilities, insecure_dependencies, missing_input_validation.

Return summary per

shared/references/audit_summary_contract.md

.

Standalone mode still writes the same JSON summary to a worker-owned run-scoped artifact path per shared contract.

Critical Rules

MANDATORY READ: Load

shared/references/audit_worker_core_contract.md

.

• Do not auto-fix: Report violations only; coordinator creates task for user to fix
• Tech stack aware: Use contextStore to apply framework-specific patterns (e.g., React XSS vs PHP XSS)
• False positive reduction: Exclude test files, example configs, documentation
• Effort realism: S = <1 hour, M = 1-4 hours, L = >4 hours
• Location precision: Always include

  file:line

  for programmatic navigation

Definition of Done

MANDATORY READ: Load

shared/references/audit_worker_core_contract.md

.

• contextStore parsed successfully (including output_dir)
• All 5 security checks completed (secrets, SQL injection, XSS, deps, validation)
• Findings collected with severity, location, effort, recommendation
• Score calculated using penalty algorithm
• Report written to

  {output_dir}/ln-621--global.md

  (atomic single Write call)
• Summary written per contract

Reference Files

• Audit output schema:

  shared/references/audit_output_schema.md

• Security audit rules: references/security_rules.md

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Version: 3.0.0 Last Updated: 2025-12-23