git clone https://github.com/majiayu000/claude-skill-registry
T=$(mktemp -d) && git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/majiayu000/claude-skill-registry "$T" && mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills && cp -r "$T/skills/data/encryption" ~/.claude/skills/majiayu000-claude-skill-registry-encryption && rm -rf "$T"
skills/data/encryption/SKILL.mdEncryption Skill
name: encryption version: 1.0.0 domain: security/cryptography risk_level: HIGH languages: [python, typescript, rust, go] frameworks: [sqlcipher, cryptography, libsodium] requires_security_review: true compliance: [GDPR, HIPAA, PCI-DSS, SOC2] last_updated: 2025-01-15
MANDATORY READING PROTOCOL: Before implementing ANY encryption, read
for key derivation andreferences/advanced-patterns.mdfor implementation patterns.references/security-examples.md
1. Overview
1.1 Purpose and Scope
This skill provides secure-by-default patterns for implementing encryption in JARVIS AI Assistant, covering:
- SQLCipher: Encrypted SQLite database with AES-256-GCM
- Argon2id: Memory-hard key derivation function
- Key Management: Secure generation, storage, rotation, and destruction
- Secure Memory: Protection against memory disclosure attacks
1.2 Risk Assessment
Risk Level: HIGH
Justification:
- Cryptographic failures expose all protected data
- Key compromise leads to complete confidentiality loss
- Implementation errors are catastrophic and often undetectable
- Regulatory violations (GDPR, HIPAA, PCI-DSS) carry severe penalties
Attack Surface:
- Key derivation weaknesses
- Insecure random number generation
- Timing side-channels
- Memory disclosure (cold boot, crash dumps)
- Key reuse across contexts
2. Core Responsibilities
2.1 Primary Functions
- Encrypt data at rest using AES-256-GCM with authenticated encryption
- Derive keys securely using Argon2id with appropriate parameters
- Manage key lifecycle including rotation, escrow, and destruction
- Protect key material in memory and during operations
- Integrate with OS keychains for master key storage
2.2 Core Principles
- TDD First - Write tests before implementation; test encryption/decryption round-trips, authentication failures, and edge cases
- Performance Aware - Cache derived keys, use streaming for large data, leverage hardware acceleration
- Security by Default - Use authenticated encryption modes, memory-hard KDFs, secure random sources
- Defense in Depth - Multiple layers of protection, fail securely, minimize key exposure
2.3 Security Principles
- NEVER implement custom cryptographic algorithms
- NEVER use ECB mode or unauthenticated encryption
- ALWAYS use cryptographically secure random number generators
- ALWAYS validate ciphertext authenticity before decryption
- ALWAYS use constant-time comparison for authentication tags
3. Implementation Workflow (TDD)
Step 1: Write Failing Test First
import pytest from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidTag class TestEncryptionTDD: """TDD tests for encryption implementation.""" def test_encrypt_decrypt_roundtrip(self): """Test that encryption followed by decryption returns original data.""" from jarvis.security.encryption import SecureEncryption key = secrets.token_bytes(32) encryptor = SecureEncryption(key) plaintext = b"sensitive data for JARVIS" ciphertext = encryptor.encrypt(plaintext) decrypted = encryptor.decrypt(ciphertext) assert decrypted == plaintext assert ciphertext != plaintext # Must be encrypted def test_tampered_ciphertext_raises_error(self): """Test that tampered ciphertext is rejected.""" from jarvis.security.encryption import SecureEncryption key = secrets.token_bytes(32) encryptor = SecureEncryption(key) ciphertext = encryptor.encrypt(b"secret") tampered = ciphertext[:-1] + bytes([ciphertext[-1] ^ 0xFF]) with pytest.raises(InvalidTag): encryptor.decrypt(tampered) def test_key_derivation_consistency(self): """Same password + salt = same key; different salt = different key.""" from jarvis.security.encryption import SecureKeyDerivation password = "strong_password_123" salt = secrets.token_bytes(16) key1, _ = SecureKeyDerivation.derive_key(password, salt) key2, _ = SecureKeyDerivation.derive_key(password, salt) assert key1 == key2 and len(key1) == 32 key3, salt3 = SecureKeyDerivation.derive_key(password) assert key1 != key3 # Different salt = different key
Step 2: Implement Minimum to Pass
Implement only what's needed to pass the tests. Start with basic encryption/decryption, then add key derivation.
Step 3: Refactor Following Patterns
After tests pass, add: memory protection, error handling, AAD support, key caching.
Step 4: Run Full Verification
# Run encryption tests with coverage pytest tests/security/test_encryption.py -v --cov=jarvis.security.encryption --cov-fail-under=90 # Run security-specific tests pytest tests/security/ -k "encryption or crypto" -v # Check for timing vulnerabilities pytest tests/security/test_timing.py -v # Verify no secrets in output pytest --log-cli-level=DEBUG 2>&1 | grep -i "key\|secret\|password" && echo "WARNING: Secrets in logs!"
4. Technology Stack
4.1 Recommended Libraries
| Language | Library | Version | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Python | | >=42.0.0 | Uses OpenSSL 3.x backend |
| Python | | >=23.1.0 | Reference Argon2 implementation |
| TypeScript | | >=0.5.0 | Audited pure-JS implementation |
| Rust | | >=0.17.0 | BoringSSL-backed |
| Go | | stdlib | Use with |
4.2 SQLCipher Configuration
Minimum Version: SQLCipher 4.5.6+ (includes SQLite 3.44.2)
# SQLCipher secure configuration SQLCIPHER_PRAGMAS = { 'key': None, # Set via secure key injection 'cipher': 'aes-256-gcm', 'kdf_iter': 256000, # PBKDF2 iterations 'cipher_page_size': 4096, 'cipher_kdf_algorithm': 'PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA512', 'cipher_hmac_algorithm': 'HMAC_SHA512', 'cipher_plaintext_header_size': 0, }
5. Performance Patterns
5.1 Key Caching
Bad: Deriving key on every operation (~500ms per Argon2id call)
Good - Cache with TTL:
class CachedKeyManager: def __init__(self, cache_ttl: int = 300): self._cache: dict[str, tuple[bytes, float]] = {} self._ttl = cache_ttl def get_key(self, password: str, salt: bytes) -> bytes: cache_key = f"{hash(password)}:{salt.hex()}" if cache_key in self._cache: key, ts = self._cache[cache_key] if time.time() - ts < self._ttl: return key key, _ = SecureKeyDerivation.derive_key(password, salt) self._cache[cache_key] = (key, time.time()) return key
5.2 Streaming Encryption for Large Data
Bad:
data = f.read() loads entire file into memory
Good - Stream with chunking (64KB chunks):
nonce = secrets.token_bytes(12) encryptor = Cipher(algorithms.AES(key), modes.GCM(nonce)).encryptor() with open(input_path, 'rb') as fin, open(output_path, 'wb') as fout: fout.write(nonce) while chunk := fin.read(64 * 1024): fout.write(encryptor.update(chunk)) fout.write(encryptor.finalize() + encryptor.tag)
5.3 Hardware Acceleration
Bad: PyCryptodome without OpenSSL backend (10-100x slower)
Good: Use
cryptography library - auto-detects AES-NI via OpenSSL 3.x backend
5.4 Batch Operations
Bad - Individual loop with append:
results = [] for record in records: results.append(encryptor.encrypt(record))
Good - List comprehension with single encryptor:
encryptor = SecureEncryption(key) results = [encryptor.encrypt(record) for record in records] # For large batches, use ProcessPoolExecutor for parallelization
5.5 Memory-Safe Key Handling
Bad - Keys remain in memory:
self.key = SecureKeyDerivation.derive_key(password) # Never cleared
Good - Zero keys after use with context manager:
import ctypes class SecureKeyHolder: def __init__(self, password: str): self._key, self.salt = SecureKeyDerivation.derive_key(password) def __exit__(self, *args): if self._key: key_buffer = (ctypes.c_char * len(self._key)).from_buffer_copy(self._key) ctypes.memset(key_buffer, 0, len(self._key)) self._key = None # Usage: with SecureKeyHolder(password) as kh: encrypt(kh._key, data)
6. Implementation Patterns
6.1 Key Derivation with Argon2id
from argon2 import PasswordHasher from argon2.low_level import hash_secret_raw, Type import secrets class SecureKeyDerivation: """Derive encryption keys from passwords using Argon2id.""" # OWASP recommended parameters for sensitive data TIME_COST = 3 # Iterations MEMORY_COST = 65536 # 64 MiB PARALLELISM = 4 # Threads HASH_LEN = 32 # 256 bits for AES-256 SALT_LEN = 16 # 128 bits minimum @classmethod def derive_key(cls, password: str, salt: bytes = None) -> tuple[bytes, bytes]: """ Derive a 256-bit key from password. Returns: tuple: (derived_key, salt) for storage """ if salt is None: salt = secrets.token_bytes(cls.SALT_LEN) # Validate inputs if not password or len(password) < 12: raise ValueError("Password must be at least 12 characters") key = hash_secret_raw( secret=password.encode('utf-8'), salt=salt, time_cost=cls.TIME_COST, memory_cost=cls.MEMORY_COST, parallelism=cls.PARALLELISM, hash_len=cls.HASH_LEN, type=Type.ID # Argon2id ) return key, salt
6.2 AES-256-GCM Encryption
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM import secrets class SecureEncryption: """AES-256-GCM authenticated encryption.""" NONCE_SIZE = 12 # 96 bits recommended for GCM KEY_SIZE = 32 # 256 bits def __init__(self, key: bytes): if len(key) != self.KEY_SIZE: raise ValueError(f"Key must be {self.KEY_SIZE} bytes") self._aesgcm = AESGCM(key) def encrypt(self, plaintext: bytes, associated_data: bytes = None) -> bytes: """ Encrypt with random nonce, prepended to ciphertext. Returns: bytes: nonce || ciphertext || tag """ nonce = secrets.token_bytes(self.NONCE_SIZE) ciphertext = self._aesgcm.encrypt(nonce, plaintext, associated_data) return nonce + ciphertext def decrypt(self, ciphertext: bytes, associated_data: bytes = None) -> bytes: """ Decrypt and verify authenticity. Raises: InvalidTag: If authentication fails """ if len(ciphertext) < self.NONCE_SIZE + 16: # nonce + tag minimum raise ValueError("Ciphertext too short") nonce = ciphertext[:self.NONCE_SIZE] actual_ciphertext = ciphertext[self.NONCE_SIZE:] return self._aesgcm.decrypt(nonce, actual_ciphertext, associated_data)
6.3 SQLCipher Database Integration
import sqlcipher3 from contextlib import contextmanager class EncryptedDatabase: """Encrypted SQLite database using SQLCipher.""" def __init__(self, db_path: str, key: bytes): self._db_path = db_path self._key = key self._conn = None @contextmanager def connect(self): """Context manager for database connections.""" conn = sqlcipher3.connect(self._db_path) try: # Apply security pragmas conn.execute(f"PRAGMA key = \"x'{self._key.hex()}'\";") conn.execute("PRAGMA cipher = 'aes-256-gcm';") conn.execute("PRAGMA kdf_iter = 256000;") conn.execute("PRAGMA cipher_page_size = 4096;") # Verify encryption is active result = conn.execute("PRAGMA cipher_version;").fetchone() if not result: raise RuntimeError("SQLCipher encryption not active") yield conn conn.commit() except Exception: conn.rollback() raise finally: conn.close() def rekey(self, new_key: bytes): """Rotate database encryption key.""" with self.connect() as conn: conn.execute(f"PRAGMA rekey = \"x'{new_key.hex()}'\";") self._key = new_key
7. Security Standards
7.1 Known Vulnerabilities
| CVE | Severity | Component | Description | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2020-27207 | High | SQLCipher <4.4.1 | Use-after-free in codec pragma | Upgrade to 4.5.6+ |
| CVE-2024-0232 | Medium | SQLite <3.44.0 | Heap use-after-free in JSON | Upgrade SQLCipher 4.5.6+ |
| CVE-2023-42811 | High | aes-gcm (Rust) | Plaintext exposure on auth failure | Upgrade to 0.10.3+ |
| CVE-2024-4603 | Medium | OpenSSL | Key derivation timing attack | Upgrade OpenSSL 3.3+ |
| CVE-2023-48056 | Medium | Crypto libs | IV reuse detection failure | Use random nonces |
7.2 OWASP Mapping
| OWASP 2025 | Relevance | Implementation |
|---|---|---|
| A02: Cryptographic Failures | Critical | AES-256-GCM, Argon2id, secure RNG |
| A04: Insecure Design | High | Threat modeling, key rotation |
| A05: Security Misconfiguration | High | Secure defaults, validation |
| A08: Software Integrity Failures | Medium | Authenticated encryption |
7.3 Cryptography Standards
Approved Algorithms:
- Symmetric: AES-256-GCM (primary), ChaCha20-Poly1305 (alternative)
- KDF: Argon2id (primary), PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 (SQLCipher)
- Hash: SHA-256, SHA-512, BLAKE2b
- RNG: OS CSPRNG only (
module,secrets
)/dev/urandom
Prohibited:
- DES, 3DES, RC4, Blowfish
- MD5, SHA-1 for security purposes
- ECB mode for any cipher
- Custom random number generators
8. Testing Requirements
See Section 3 (Implementation Workflow - TDD) for comprehensive test examples including:
- Encryption/decryption round-trips
- Ciphertext tampering detection
- Key derivation consistency
- Nonce uniqueness validation
9. Common Mistakes
9.1 Critical Anti-Patterns
| Anti-Pattern | Never Do | Always Do |
|---|---|---|
| ECB Mode | | |
| Hardcoded Keys | | |
| Predictable Nonces | | |
| No Auth | | |
| Weak KDF | | |
10. Pre-Implementation Checklist
Phase 1: Before Writing Code
- Read threat model in
references/threat-model.md - Identify data classification (PII, PHI, credentials)
- Choose appropriate algorithm (AES-256-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305)
- Design key derivation strategy (Argon2id parameters)
- Plan key storage (OS keychain integration)
- Write failing tests for encrypt/decrypt round-trips
- Write tests for authentication tag verification
- Write tests for key derivation consistency
Phase 2: During Implementation
- Use
library (not custom implementations)cryptography - Generate nonces with
secrets.token_bytes(12) - Implement key caching with TTL for performance
- Use streaming for files >10MB
- Zero key material after use (SecureKeyHolder pattern)
- Add associated data (AAD) for context binding
- Handle InvalidTag exceptions without leaking info
- Run tests after each function implementation
Phase 3: Before Committing
- All TDD tests pass with 90%+ coverage
- Nonce uniqueness validated over 10,000+ operations
- Key derivation timing variance <10%
- No secrets in logs (
)grep -i "key\|secret\|password" - Dependency scanning clean (no CVEs)
- Performance benchmarks meet targets:
- Key derivation: <1s
- Encryption: >100MB/s
- Batch operations: Linear scaling
- Security review requested for HIGH risk code
11. Summary
Key Objectives: AES-256-GCM with random nonces, Argon2id KDF, OS keychain integration, authenticated encryption, key rotation support.
Security Reminders: No custom crypto, use audited libraries, test auth tags, rotate keys on schedule.
References:
references/advanced-patterns.md, references/security-examples.md, references/threat-model.md
Encryption done wrong is worse than no encryption - it provides false confidence.