Claude-skill-registry epistemology
Master epistemology - the theory of knowledge, justification, and belief. Use for: knowledge, justification, skepticism, sources of knowledge, epistemic virtue. Triggers: 'knowledge', 'epistemology', 'justification', 'belief', 'Gettier', 'skepticism', 'certainty', 'evidence', 'testimony', 'perception', 'reason', 'a priori', 'empirical', 'reliability', 'internalism', 'externalism', 'foundationalism', 'coherentism'.
git clone https://github.com/majiayu000/claude-skill-registry
T=$(mktemp -d) && git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/majiayu000/claude-skill-registry "$T" && mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills && cp -r "$T/skills/data/epistemology" ~/.claude/skills/majiayu000-claude-skill-registry-epistemology && rm -rf "$T"
skills/data/epistemology/SKILL.mdEpistemology Skill
Master the theory of knowledge: What is knowledge? How is belief justified? Can we know anything?
Core Questions
| Question | Issue | Stakes |
|---|---|---|
| What is knowledge? | Analysis | Definition of knowledge |
| What justifies belief? | Justification | Epistemic norms |
| Can we know anything? | Skepticism | Scope of knowledge |
| What are sources of knowledge? | Sources | Perception, reason, testimony |
The Analysis of Knowledge
Traditional Analysis
JTB: Knowledge = Justified True Belief
S knows that P iff: 1. S believes that P (belief condition) 2. P is true (truth condition) 3. S is justified in believing P (justification condition)
Gettier Problem
Gettier Cases show JTB is not sufficient:
GETTIER CASE #1 ═══════════════ Smith has strong evidence that Jones will get the job (told by company president). Smith also knows Jones has 10 coins in his pocket. Smith infers: "The man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket." Unknown to Smith: HE (Smith) will get the job. And Smith happens to have 10 coins in his pocket. Smith's belief is: ✓ Justified (by evidence about Jones) ✓ True (Smith will get job, has 10 coins) ✗ NOT knowledge (too lucky!)
Post-Gettier Theories
Fourth Condition Approaches:
- No false lemmas
- Causal connection
- Defeasibility (no truths that would defeat justification)
Tracking (Nozick):
- S knows P iff: If P were false, S wouldn't believe P
- Sensitivity condition
Safety (Sosa, Pritchard):
- S knows P iff: S couldn't easily have been wrong
- In nearby possible worlds where S believes P, P is true
Virtue Epistemology:
- Knowledge = true belief from intellectual virtue
- Success attributable to cognitive ability
Theories of Justification
Foundationalism
FOUNDATIONALIST STRUCTURE ═════════════════════════ DERIVED BELIEFS ├── Justified by inference ├── From more basic beliefs └── Not self-justifying ↑ │ BASIC BELIEFS ├── Self-justifying ├── Need no support from other beliefs └── Foundation of knowledge
Basic Beliefs:
- Classical: self-evident, incorrigible
- Modest: defeasibly justified without inference
Coherentism
COHERENTIST STRUCTURE ═════════════════════ ┌─────────────────────┐ │ │ ┌───▼───┐ ┌─────┴───┐ │ Belief ├──────────►│ Belief │ │ A │◄──────────┤ B │ └───┬────┘ └────┬───┘ │ │ │ ┌─────────┐ │ └────► Belief ◄──────┘ │ C │ └────────┘ No foundations; mutual support
Objection: Coherent fiction could be well-justified but false (isolation problem)
Infinitism
- No basic beliefs
- No circular justification
- Infinite regress is not vicious
- We can always provide further reasons
Internalism vs. Externalism
| Internalism | Externalism |
|---|---|
| Justifiers must be accessible to subject | Justifiers may be external |
| What I can know by reflection | Reliable processes suffice |
| Epistemic responsibility | Connection to truth matters |
| Examples: evidentialism | Examples: reliabilism |
Skepticism
Cartesian Skepticism
SKEPTICAL ARGUMENT ══════════════════ 1. I cannot know I'm not a brain in a vat (BIV) 2. If I know I have hands, I can deduce I'm not a BIV 3. If I can't know the conclusion, I can't know the premise 4. Therefore, I don't know I have hands CLOSURE PRINCIPLE: If S knows P, and S knows P→Q, then S can know Q
Responses to Skepticism
Moorean Shift:
- I know I have hands
- If I have hands, I'm not a BIV
- Therefore, I know I'm not a BIV
- Common sense trumps skeptical premises
Contextualism:
- "Know" has different standards in different contexts
- In everyday contexts, we do know
- In philosophical contexts, standards are higher
- Both claims are true (in their contexts)
Relevant Alternatives:
- Knowledge requires ruling out relevant alternatives
- BIV is not a relevant alternative in normal contexts
Sources of Knowledge
Perception
Direct Realism: We perceive external objects directly Indirect Realism: We perceive sense-data caused by objects Idealism: Objects are mind-dependent
Problems:
- Perceptual error, illusion
- Skepticism about external world
- Theory-ladenness of observation
Reason (A Priori Knowledge)
Rationalism: Some knowledge is innate or a priori Examples: Mathematics, logic, conceptual truths
Problems:
- How do we access a priori truths?
- Are they merely analytic?
- Quine's attack on analytic/synthetic distinction
Testimony
Reductionism: Testimony reducible to other sources Anti-Reductionism: Testimony is fundamental source
Conditions: Speaker sincerity, competence, listener's critical uptake
Memory
Preservative: Memory preserves justification Generative: Memory can generate new knowledge Problems: False memories, reliability
Key Concepts
Epistemic Virtues
| Virtue | Description |
|---|---|
| Intellectual humility | Recognizing limits |
| Open-mindedness | Considering alternatives |
| Intellectual courage | Pursuing truth despite cost |
| Thoroughness | Careful investigation |
| Fair-mindedness | Impartial assessment |
Evidence
Evidentialism: Justification proportional to evidence Evidence types: Perceptual, testimonial, inferential
Degrees of Belief (Bayesian)
- Credences: Degrees of belief (0-1)
- Conditionalization: Update on evidence
- Bayes' theorem: P(H|E) = P(E|H)·P(H)/P(E)
Key Vocabulary
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Justified | Having good reasons |
| A priori | Independent of experience |
| A posteriori | Dependent on experience |
| Analytic | True by meaning |
| Synthetic | True by world |
| Infallible | Cannot be wrong |
| Defeasible | Can be overridden |
| Propositional knowledge | Knowledge that P |
| Knowledge how | Practical knowledge |
| Epistemic luck | Being right by chance |
| Closure | Knowledge closed under known entailment |
Integration with Repository
Related Themes
: Epistemological explorationsthoughts/knowledge/
: Perception, self-knowledgethoughts/consciousness/