Asi counter-surveillance
Assess and harden operational security (OPSEC) posture for applications, communications, and infrastructure. Identifies surveillance exposure, metadata leakage, and tracking vectors. Use when auditing privacy-sensitive applications, reviewing OPSEC for threat models involving state-level adversaries, or hardening communications infrastructure.
git clone https://github.com/plurigrid/asi
T=$(mktemp -d) && git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/plurigrid/asi "$T" && mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills && cp -r "$T/skills/counter-surveillance" ~/.claude/skills/plurigrid-asi-counter-surveillance && rm -rf "$T"
skills/counter-surveillance/SKILL.mdCounter-Surveillance Security Skill
Trail of Bits-style defensive security assessment focused on surveillance resistance, metadata minimization, and operational security hardening.
When to Use
- Auditing privacy-sensitive applications
- Reviewing journalist/activist threat models
- Hardening communications platforms
- Assessing metadata leakage in protocols and applications
- Evaluating anonymous communication systems
- Reviewing data retention and logging policies
- Assessing exposure to lawful intercept and legal compulsion
Threat Model Tiers
Structure analysis by adversary capability. Each tier subsumes the capabilities of all lower tiers.
| Tier | Adversary | Capabilities |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Passive network observer | ISP, coffee shop WiFi, upstream AS. Sees DNS, IP flows, unencrypted traffic. |
| 2 | Active network attacker | MITM, DNS manipulation, BGP hijack, certificate compromise via rogue CA. |
| 3 | Platform-level adversary | Cloud provider, app store, OS vendor. Access to plaintext data at rest, push notification content, software update channel. |
| 4 | State-level | Lawful intercept (CALEA), FISA orders, national security letters with gag orders, IMSI catchers (Stingray), device exploit vendors (NSO Group). |
| 5 | Global passive adversary | Traffic analysis across jurisdictions, correlation attacks on anonymity networks, upstream cable taps (UPSTREAM/PRISM-class). |
Always define the threat tier before beginning an audit. Controls adequate for Tier 1 are meaningless against Tier 4.
Surveillance Surface Taxonomy
Network Metadata
- DNS queries (reveal browsing intent even with HTTPS)
- TLS SNI field (reveals destination hostname in plaintext pre-ECH)
- Connection timing and duration patterns
- Packet sizes and inter-arrival times (traffic fingerprinting)
- IP address correlation across sessions
Application Metadata
- Push notification payloads (visible to Apple/Google)
- App store analytics and telemetry
- Crash reports containing device state
- Update check frequency and timing
- OAuth token exchanges revealing service usage
Device Fingerprinting
- Browser fingerprint (canvas, WebGL, fonts, screen resolution)
- Hardware identifiers (IMEI, MAC address, serial numbers)
- Sensor data (accelerometer, gyroscope uniqueness)
- Installed font and plugin enumeration
- TLS client fingerprint (JA3/JA4)
Location Tracking
- GPS and GNSS precise positioning
- Cell tower triangulation (passive, no user consent needed)
- WiFi positioning (BSSID databases)
- Bluetooth beacons and BLE scanning
- IP geolocation databases
Communications Metadata
- Who-talks-to-whom social graph (contact chaining)
- Timing and frequency of communication
- Message size and duration patterns
- Group membership inference
- Presence and online status indicators
Financial Tracking
- Payment processor transaction logs
- Blockchain analysis and address clustering
- Loyalty program purchase correlation
- ATM and POS location tracking
- Subscription service usage patterns
Audit Methodology
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Map data flows — Diagram all metadata emission points from client to server to third party. Include DNS resolvers, CDNs, analytics, crash reporting, and push notification services.
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Assess encryption coverage — Evaluate protection for data in transit (TLS 1.3, certificate pinning), at rest (full-disk encryption, per-record encryption), and in use (enclaves, MPC, FHE where applicable).
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Evaluate authentication without identification — Can users authenticate to the service without revealing real-world identity? Review account creation flow, recovery mechanisms, and payment requirements.
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Review logging and data retention — What identifiers are logged server-side? For how long? Under what legal jurisdiction? Can logs be compelled via subpoena, NSL, or FISA order?
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Test traffic analysis resistance — Are encrypted messages padded to uniform size? Is timing randomized? Is cover traffic generated? Can an observer distinguish message types by size or pattern?
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Assess supply chain integrity — Are builds reproducible? Are dependencies pinned and audited? Is the signing key air-gapped? Can users verify binary-to-source correspondence?
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Review jurisdiction and legal compulsion exposure — Map server locations, corporate domicile, and applicable legal frameworks. Identify single points of legal compulsion (one subpoena reveals all user data).
Code Review Patterns
Look for these anti-patterns in privacy-sensitive codebases:
# FINDING: Unnecessary logging of user identifiers logger.info(f"Request from user {user_id} at {ip_address}") # FIX: Log only what is operationally necessary; use rotating pseudonyms # FINDING: Unpadded encrypted messages reveal content type encrypted = encrypt(message) # FIX: Pad all messages to fixed size buckets before encryption encrypted = encrypt(pad_to_bucket(message)) # FINDING: Timestamps with unnecessary precision created_at = datetime.utcnow() # microsecond precision # FIX: Round to reduce temporal fingerprinting created_at = datetime.utcnow().replace(minute=0, second=0, microsecond=0) # FINDING: Device identifiers transmitted to server analytics.send(device_id=get_hardware_id()) # FIX: Use unlinkable session tokens; never transmit hardware IDs # FINDING: DNS queries leaking browsing intent requests.get("https://sensitive-site.org/resource") # FIX: Enforce DNS-over-HTTPS/TLS; consider Tor for DNS resolution # FINDING: Push notification content visible to platform provider send_push(user, title="New message from Alice") # FIX: Send empty/tombstone push; fetch content via E2E encrypted channel # FINDING: Certificate pinning absent or bypassable session = requests.Session() # no pin validation # FIX: Pin leaf or intermediate cert; detect and alert on pin failure
Hardening Checklist
- Network anonymity — Tor/onion routing for metadata-resistant connectivity
- E2E encrypted messaging — Signal protocol or equivalent with forward secrecy
- Metadata-resistant protocols — Sealed Sender, Private Information Retrieval, oblivious HTTP
- Encrypted DNS — DNS-over-HTTPS or DNS-over-TLS with trusted resolver; ECH for SNI
- Reproducible builds — Deterministic compilation; users can verify binary matches source
- Air-gapped signing — Software release signing keys on offline hardware
- Memory-safe crypto — Rust, Go, or formally verified C for cryptographic implementations
- Minimal logging — Log only what is operationally essential; auto-expire within days
- Jurisdiction diversity — Distribute infrastructure across non-cooperating legal jurisdictions
- Warrant canary — Publish regular signed statements of non-compromise; absence signals compulsion
- Anonymous account creation — No phone number, no email, no payment required
- Forward secrecy — Compromise of long-term keys does not reveal past communications
Related Skills
— Automated code scanning for security vulnerabilitiesstatic-security-analyzer
— Web application penetration testing methodologywebapp-testing
— Secure development lifecycle and CI/CD hardeningsecure-workflow-guide