Asi detecting-api-enumeration-attacks
Detect and prevent API enumeration attacks including BOLA and IDOR exploitation by monitoring sequential identifier access patterns and authorization failures.
git clone https://github.com/plurigrid/asi
T=$(mktemp -d) && git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/plurigrid/asi "$T" && mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills && cp -r "$T/plugins/asi/skills/detecting-api-enumeration-attacks" ~/.claude/skills/plurigrid-asi-detecting-api-enumeration-attacks && rm -rf "$T"
plugins/asi/skills/detecting-api-enumeration-attacks/SKILL.mdDetecting API Enumeration Attacks
Overview
API enumeration attacks occur when attackers systematically probe API endpoints with sequential or predictable identifiers to discover and access unauthorized resources. Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA), ranked as API1:2023 in the OWASP API Security Top 10, is the most critical API vulnerability. Attackers manipulate object identifiers (user IDs, order numbers, account references) in API requests to bypass authorization and access other users' data. Detection requires monitoring for patterns of rapid sequential access attempts, authorization failures, and abnormal API usage behavior.
When to Use
- When investigating security incidents that require detecting api enumeration attacks
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Prerequisites
- API gateway or reverse proxy with logging enabled (Kong, AWS API Gateway, Apigee)
- SIEM platform (Splunk, Elastic SIEM, or Microsoft Sentinel)
- Access to API server logs with request details
- Web Application Firewall (WAF) with API protection capabilities
- Understanding of the API's authorization model and object identifier schemes
Attack Patterns to Detect
1. Sequential ID Enumeration
Attackers iterate through numeric or predictable identifiers:
GET /api/v1/users/1001 -> 200 OK GET /api/v1/users/1002 -> 200 OK GET /api/v1/users/1003 -> 403 Forbidden GET /api/v1/users/1004 -> 200 OK GET /api/v1/users/1005 -> 200 OK ...
Detection Indicators:
- Rapid sequential requests to the same endpoint with incrementing IDs
- Mix of 200/403/401 responses from same source
- Request rate exceeding normal user behavior
- Access to resources outside authenticated user's scope
2. UUID/GUID Enumeration
Even non-sequential identifiers can be enumerated if leaked through other endpoints:
# Attacker first harvests UUIDs from a list endpoint GET /api/v1/posts?page=1 -> Returns post objects with author UUIDs # Then uses those UUIDs to access restricted user data GET /api/v1/users/a3f2c1e4-... -> Private user profile GET /api/v1/users/b7d9e8f1-... -> Private user profile
3. Parameter Tampering Enumeration
# Authenticated as user_id=100, attempting to access other users' orders GET /api/v1/orders?user_id=101 GET /api/v1/orders?user_id=102 GET /api/v1/orders?user_id=103
Detection Rules
Splunk Detection Queries
# Detect sequential ID enumeration on API endpoints index=api_logs sourcetype=api_access | rex field=uri_path "(?<endpoint>/api/v\d+/\w+/)(?<object_id>\d+)" | stats count as request_count, dc(object_id) as unique_ids, values(status_code) as status_codes, min(_time) as first_seen, max(_time) as last_seen by src_ip, endpoint, user_session | eval time_span = last_seen - first_seen | eval requests_per_second = request_count / max(time_span, 1) | where unique_ids > 20 AND requests_per_second > 2 | eval severity = case( unique_ids > 100, "critical", unique_ids > 50, "high", unique_ids > 20, "medium", 1==1, "low" ) | sort - unique_ids | table src_ip, endpoint, unique_ids, request_count, requests_per_second, status_codes, severity # Detect BOLA via authorization failure patterns index=api_logs sourcetype=api_access status_code IN (401, 403) | bin _time span=5m | stats count as failure_count, dc(uri_path) as unique_paths, values(uri_path) as attempted_paths by _time, src_ip, user_id | where failure_count > 10 | eval attack_type = if(unique_paths > 5, "enumeration", "brute_force")
Elastic SIEM Detection Rules
{ "rule": { "name": "API Object Enumeration Detection", "description": "Detects rapid sequential access to API objects with mixed authorization results", "type": "threshold", "index": ["api-access-*"], "query": { "bool": { "must": [ { "regexp": { "url.path": "/api/v[0-9]+/[a-z]+/[0-9]+" } } ], "should": [ { "term": { "http.response.status_code": 200 } }, { "term": { "http.response.status_code": 403 } }, { "term": { "http.response.status_code": 401 } } ] } }, "threshold": { "field": ["source.ip"], "value": 50, "cardinality": [ { "field": "url.path", "value": 20 } ] }, "schedule": { "interval": "5m" }, "severity": "high", "risk_score": 73, "tags": ["OWASP-API1", "BOLA", "Enumeration"] } }
Custom Detection Script
#!/usr/bin/env python3 """API Enumeration Attack Detector Analyzes API access logs to detect enumeration patterns including BOLA, IDOR, and sequential ID probing. """ import re import sys import json from collections import defaultdict from datetime import datetime, timedelta from dataclasses import dataclass, field from typing import List, Dict, Optional @dataclass class AccessRecord: timestamp: datetime source_ip: str user_id: Optional[str] method: str path: str status_code: int object_id: Optional[str] = None @dataclass class EnumerationAlert: source_ip: str user_id: Optional[str] endpoint_pattern: str unique_object_ids: int total_requests: int time_window_seconds: float requests_per_second: float auth_failure_ratio: float severity: str attack_type: str sample_ids: List[str] = field(default_factory=list) class EnumerationDetector: # Regex patterns for extracting object IDs from API paths ID_PATTERNS = [ re.compile(r'/api/v\d+/(\w+)/(\d+)'), # Numeric IDs re.compile(r'/api/v\d+/(\w+)/([a-f0-9\-]{36})'), # UUIDs re.compile(r'/api/v\d+/(\w+)/([a-zA-Z0-9]{20,})'), # Long alphanumeric IDs ] def __init__(self, time_window_minutes: int = 5, min_unique_ids: int = 15, max_requests_per_second: float = 5.0): self.time_window = timedelta(minutes=time_window_minutes) self.min_unique_ids = min_unique_ids self.max_rps = max_requests_per_second self.access_log: List[AccessRecord] = [] def parse_log_line(self, line: str) -> Optional[AccessRecord]: """Parse a common log format line into an AccessRecord.""" log_pattern = re.compile( r'(?P<ip>[\d.]+)\s+\S+\s+(?P<user>\S+)\s+' r'\[(?P<time>[^\]]+)\]\s+' r'"(?P<method>\w+)\s+(?P<path>\S+)\s+\S+"\s+' r'(?P<status>\d+)' ) match = log_pattern.match(line) if not match: return None path = match.group('path') object_id = None for pattern in self.ID_PATTERNS: id_match = pattern.search(path) if id_match: object_id = id_match.group(2) break return AccessRecord( timestamp=datetime.strptime(match.group('time'), '%d/%b/%Y:%H:%M:%S %z'), source_ip=match.group('ip'), user_id=match.group('user') if match.group('user') != '-' else None, method=match.group('method'), path=path, status_code=int(match.group('status')), object_id=object_id ) def analyze(self, records: List[AccessRecord]) -> List[EnumerationAlert]: """Analyze access records for enumeration patterns.""" alerts = [] # Group by source IP and endpoint pattern grouped = defaultdict(list) for record in records: if record.object_id: # Normalize endpoint by removing the specific object ID endpoint = re.sub(r'/[a-f0-9\-]{36}', '/{id}', re.sub(r'/\d+', '/{id}', record.path)) key = (record.source_ip, record.user_id, endpoint) grouped[key].append(record) for (src_ip, user_id, endpoint), records_group in grouped.items(): if len(records_group) < self.min_unique_ids: continue # Sort by timestamp records_group.sort(key=lambda r: r.timestamp) # Analyze time windows window_start = 0 for window_start in range(len(records_group)): window_records = [] for r in records_group[window_start:]: if r.timestamp - records_group[window_start].timestamp <= self.time_window: window_records.append(r) unique_ids = set(r.object_id for r in window_records) if len(unique_ids) < self.min_unique_ids: continue time_span = (window_records[-1].timestamp - window_records[0].timestamp).total_seconds() rps = len(window_records) / max(time_span, 1) auth_failures = sum(1 for r in window_records if r.status_code in (401, 403)) failure_ratio = auth_failures / len(window_records) # Determine severity if len(unique_ids) > 100: severity = "critical" elif len(unique_ids) > 50 or failure_ratio > 0.5: severity = "high" elif len(unique_ids) > 20: severity = "medium" else: severity = "low" # Determine attack type ids_list = sorted([r.object_id for r in window_records if r.object_id and r.object_id.isdigit()]) is_sequential = self._check_sequential(ids_list) attack_type = "sequential_enumeration" if is_sequential else "random_enumeration" alert = EnumerationAlert( source_ip=src_ip, user_id=user_id, endpoint_pattern=endpoint, unique_object_ids=len(unique_ids), total_requests=len(window_records), time_window_seconds=time_span, requests_per_second=round(rps, 2), auth_failure_ratio=round(failure_ratio, 2), severity=severity, attack_type=attack_type, sample_ids=list(unique_ids)[:10] ) alerts.append(alert) break # One alert per group return alerts def _check_sequential(self, ids: List[str]) -> bool: """Check if numeric IDs follow a sequential pattern.""" if len(ids) < 5: return False try: numeric_ids = sorted(int(i) for i in ids) sequential_count = sum( 1 for i in range(1, len(numeric_ids)) if numeric_ids[i] - numeric_ids[i-1] <= 2 ) return sequential_count / len(numeric_ids) > 0.7 except ValueError: return False def main(): detector = EnumerationDetector( time_window_minutes=5, min_unique_ids=15 ) log_file = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "/var/log/api/access.log" records = [] with open(log_file, 'r') as f: for line in f: record = detector.parse_log_line(line.strip()) if record: records.append(record) alerts = detector.analyze(records) if alerts: print(f"\n[!] {len(alerts)} enumeration attack(s) detected:\n") for alert in alerts: print(f" Source IP: {alert.source_ip}") print(f" User ID: {alert.user_id}") print(f" Endpoint: {alert.endpoint_pattern}") print(f" Unique IDs Accessed: {alert.unique_object_ids}") print(f" Requests/sec: {alert.requests_per_second}") print(f" Auth Failure Ratio: {alert.auth_failure_ratio}") print(f" Attack Type: {alert.attack_type}") print(f" Severity: {alert.severity.upper()}") print(f" Sample IDs: {alert.sample_ids}") print() else: print("[+] No enumeration attacks detected.") if __name__ == "__main__": main()
Prevention Controls
Server-Side Authorization Enforcement
# Always validate object ownership at the data layer def get_user_order(request, order_id): order = Order.objects.get(id=order_id) if order.user_id != request.user.id: raise PermissionDenied("Not authorized to access this order") return order
Use Unpredictable Identifiers
import uuid # Use UUIDs instead of sequential integers class Order(Model): id = UUIDField(default=uuid.uuid4, primary_key=True)
Implement Rate Limiting Per Endpoint
# Kong rate limiting per API route plugins: - name: rate-limiting config: minute: 30 policy: redis limit_by: credential
References
- OWASP API1:2023 Broken Object Level Authorization: https://owasp.org/API-Security/editions/2023/en/0xa1-broken-object-level-authorization/
- Traceable.ai BOLA Deep Dive: https://www.traceable.ai/blog-post/a-deep-dive-on-the-most-critical-api-vulnerability----bola-broken-object-level-authorization
- Cequence BOLA Prevention: https://www.cequence.ai/solutions/bola-and-enumeration-attack-prevention/
- Cloudflare API Shield BOLA Detection: https://community.cloudflare.com/t/api-shield-new-bola-vulnerability-detection-for-api-shield/883021
- Sycope IDOR Detection via HTTP Traffic Analysis: https://www.sycope.com/post/idor-vulnerability-how-to-detect-an-attack-on-web-applications-through-http-traffic-analysis