Asi hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi

Detect WMI-based lateral movement by analyzing Windows Event ID 4688 process creation and Sysmon Event ID 1 for WmiPrvSE.exe child process patterns, remote process execution, and WMI event subscription persistence.

install

source · Clone the upstream repo

git clone https://github.com/plurigrid/asi

Claude Code · Install into ~/.claude/skills/

T=$(mktemp -d) && git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/plurigrid/asi "$T" && mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills && cp -r "$T/plugins/asi/skills/hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi" ~/.claude/skills/plurigrid-asi-hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi && rm -rf "$T"

manifest: plugins/asi/skills/hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi/SKILL.md

Hunting for Lateral Movement via WMI

Overview

Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is commonly abused for lateral movement via

wmic process call create

or Win32_Process.Create() to execute commands on remote hosts. Detection focuses on identifying WmiPrvSE.exe spawning child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) in Windows Security Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event ID 1 logs, along with WMI-Activity/Operational events (5857, 5860, 5861) for event subscription persistence.

When to Use

When investigating security incidents that require hunting for lateral movement via wmi
When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques

Prerequisites

Windows Security Event Logs with Process Creation auditing enabled (Event 4688 with command line)
Sysmon installed with Event ID 1 (Process Creation) configured
Python 3.9+ with
```
python-evtx
```
,
```
lxml
```
libraries
Understanding of WMI architecture and WmiPrvSE.exe behavior

Steps

Step 1: Parse Process Creation Events

Extract Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event 1 entries from EVTX files.

Step 2: Detect WmiPrvSE Child Processes

Flag processes where ParentImage/ParentProcessName is WmiPrvSE.exe, indicating remote WMI execution.

Step 3: Analyze Command Line Patterns

Identify suspicious command lines matching WMI lateral movement patterns (cmd.exe /q /c, output redirection to admin$ share).

Step 4: Check WMI Event Subscriptions

Parse WMI-Activity/Operational log for event consumer creation indicating persistence.

Expected Output

JSON report with WMI-spawned processes, suspicious command lines, WMI event subscription alerts, and timeline of lateral movement activity.