Asi performing-dns-enumeration-and-zone-transfer
install
source · Clone the upstream repo
git clone https://github.com/plurigrid/asi
Claude Code · Install into ~/.claude/skills/
T=$(mktemp -d) && git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/plurigrid/asi "$T" && mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills && cp -r "$T/plugins/asi/skills/performing-dns-enumeration-and-zone-transfer" ~/.claude/skills/plurigrid-asi-performing-dns-enumeration-and-zone-transfer && rm -rf "$T"
manifest:
plugins/asi/skills/performing-dns-enumeration-and-zone-transfer/SKILL.mdsource content
Performing DNS Enumeration and Zone Transfer
When to Use
- Mapping the external attack surface of a target organization during authorized penetration tests
- Discovering hidden subdomains, internal hostnames, and IP addresses exposed via DNS records
- Testing whether DNS servers allow unauthorized zone transfers that leak the entire zone file
- Identifying mail servers, name servers, and service records for further targeted testing
- Validating DNS security configurations including DNSSEC, SPF, DKIM, and DMARC
Do not use against domains you do not have authorization to test, for DNS amplification or reflection attacks, or to overwhelm DNS servers with excessive query volumes.
Prerequisites
- Written authorization to perform DNS enumeration against the target domain
- DNS enumeration tools installed: dig, nslookup, host, dnsrecon, dnsenum, subfinder, amass
- Network access to the target's DNS servers (UDP/TCP port 53)
- Wordlist for subdomain brute-forcing (SecLists dns-wordlist or similar)
- Understanding of DNS record types (A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, TXT, SOA, SRV, PTR)
Workflow
Step 1: Identify DNS Servers and Basic Records
# Find authoritative name servers dig NS example.com +short # ns1.example.com. # ns2.example.com. # Get SOA record for zone metadata dig SOA example.com +short # ns1.example.com. admin.example.com. 2024031501 3600 900 604800 86400 # Enumerate all common record types dig example.com ANY +noall +answer # Get MX records (mail servers) dig MX example.com +short # 10 mail.example.com. # 20 mail-backup.example.com. # Get TXT records (SPF, DKIM, DMARC, verification) dig TXT example.com +short # Check for DMARC policy dig TXT _dmarc.example.com +short # Check for DKIM selectors dig TXT default._domainkey.example.com +short dig TXT selector1._domainkey.example.com +short dig TXT google._domainkey.example.com +short # Get SRV records for common services dig SRV _sip._tcp.example.com +short dig SRV _ldap._tcp.example.com +short dig SRV _kerberos._tcp.example.com +short
Step 2: Attempt Zone Transfers
# Attempt AXFR zone transfer against each name server dig AXFR example.com @ns1.example.com dig AXFR example.com @ns2.example.com # Use host command for zone transfer host -t axfr example.com ns1.example.com # Use dnsrecon for automated zone transfer attempts dnsrecon -d example.com -t axfr # If zone transfer succeeds, save the output dig AXFR example.com @ns1.example.com > zone_transfer_results.txt # Test for IXFR (incremental zone transfer) dig IXFR=2024031500 example.com @ns1.example.com
Step 3: Subdomain Enumeration via Brute Force
# Use dnsenum for comprehensive enumeration dnsenum --dnsserver ns1.example.com --enum -f /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-5000.txt -r example.com -o dnsenum_output.xml # Use dnsrecon with brute force dnsrecon -d example.com -t brt -D /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-5000.txt # Use gobuster for fast DNS brute forcing gobuster dns -d example.com -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-20000.txt -t 50 -o gobuster_dns.txt # Use subfinder for passive subdomain discovery subfinder -d example.com -all -o subfinder_results.txt # Use amass for comprehensive enumeration (passive + active) amass enum -d example.com -passive -o amass_passive.txt amass enum -d example.com -active -brute -o amass_active.txt # Combine and deduplicate results cat subfinder_results.txt amass_passive.txt amass_active.txt gobuster_dns.txt | sort -u > all_subdomains.txt
Step 4: Reverse DNS and PTR Enumeration
# Reverse DNS lookup on discovered IP ranges dnsrecon -d example.com -t rvl -r 10.10.0.0/24 # PTR record enumeration for IP range for ip in $(seq 1 254); do result=$(dig -x 10.10.1.$ip +short 2>/dev/null) if [ -n "$result" ]; then echo "10.10.1.$ip -> $result" fi done # Use Nmap for reverse DNS on a subnet nmap -sL 10.10.0.0/24 | grep "(" | awk '{print $5, $6}' # Check for DNS cache snooping (information about queried domains) dig @ns1.example.com www.competitor.com +norecurse
Step 5: Analyze DNS Security Configuration
# Check DNSSEC validation dig example.com +dnssec +short dig DNSKEY example.com +short dig DS example.com +short # Test for DNS rebinding vulnerability # Check if the DNS server has a short TTL that could enable rebinding dig example.com +noall +answer | grep -i ttl # Check for open recursive resolver (misconfiguration) dig @ns1.example.com google.com +recurse # If it resolves, the server is an open resolver # Check for wildcard DNS records dig nonexistent-subdomain-xyz123.example.com +short # If it resolves, a wildcard record exists # Test DNS over HTTPS/TLS support # DoH test curl -s -H 'accept: application/dns-json' 'https://dns.google/resolve?name=example.com&type=A' # Verify SPF record for email security dig TXT example.com +short | grep "v=spf1" # Check for overly permissive SPF (+all, ?all)
Step 6: Resolve and Map All Discovered Subdomains
# Resolve all discovered subdomains to IP addresses while read subdomain; do ip=$(dig +short A "$subdomain" | head -1) if [ -n "$ip" ]; then echo "$subdomain,$ip" fi done < all_subdomains.txt > resolved_subdomains.csv # Identify unique IP addresses and their locations cut -d',' -f2 resolved_subdomains.csv | sort -u > unique_ips.txt # Check for internal IP addresses leaked via DNS grep -E "^10\.|^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.|^192\.168\." resolved_subdomains.csv > internal_ip_leaks.txt # Use httpx to probe web services on discovered subdomains cat all_subdomains.txt | httpx -title -status-code -tech-detect -o httpx_results.txt # Screenshot web services for documentation cat all_subdomains.txt | httpx -screenshot -o screenshots/
Key Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Zone Transfer (AXFR) | DNS mechanism that replicates the complete zone file from a primary to secondary server; unauthorized transfers expose all records in the zone |
| Subdomain Enumeration | Process of discovering valid subdomains through brute force, certificate transparency logs, search engines, and passive DNS databases |
| DNSSEC | DNS Security Extensions that add cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and spoofing attacks |
| SPF/DKIM/DMARC | Email authentication protocols defined in DNS TXT records that prevent email spoofing and domain impersonation |
| Wildcard DNS | A DNS record using an asterisk (*) that matches any query for non-existent subdomains, potentially masking enumeration results |
| PTR Record | Reverse DNS record that maps an IP address to a hostname, often revealing internal naming conventions and server roles |
Tools & Systems
- dig: Standard DNS lookup utility with full support for all record types, DNSSEC validation, and zone transfer queries
- dnsrecon: Comprehensive DNS enumeration tool supporting zone transfers, brute force, reverse lookup, cache snooping, and Google dork queries
- subfinder: Fast passive subdomain discovery tool that queries certificate transparency logs, search engines, and DNS databases
- Amass (OWASP): Advanced attack surface mapping tool with both passive and active DNS enumeration, graph analysis, and data source integration
- gobuster: Fast brute-force tool for DNS subdomain enumeration using configurable wordlists and concurrent threads
Common Scenarios
Scenario: External Reconnaissance for a Web Application Penetration Test
Context: A security consultant is performing external reconnaissance for a web application penetration test. The client's primary domain is example.com, and the scope includes all subdomains and related infrastructure. The consultant has authorization to enumerate DNS records and probe discovered web services.
Approach:
- Query NS, MX, TXT, and SOA records for example.com to map the DNS infrastructure
- Attempt zone transfers against both nameservers -- ns2 succeeds, revealing 347 DNS records including internal staging environments
- Run subfinder and amass in passive mode to discover 89 additional subdomains from certificate transparency logs
- Brute-force subdomains with a 20,000-word list using gobuster, discovering 12 more subdomains not found in passive sources
- Resolve all subdomains and identify 15 that resolve to internal RFC1918 addresses (information disclosure)
- Probe all web-accessible subdomains with httpx, discovering a staging environment (staging.example.com) with default credentials
- Report zone transfer vulnerability, internal IP disclosure, and exposed staging environment to the client
Pitfalls:
- Sending thousands of DNS queries per second and triggering rate limiting or DNS-based DDoS protection
- Not checking for wildcard DNS records, resulting in false positive subdomain discoveries
- Missing subdomains that use separate DNS providers or CDN-specific CNAME records
- Overlooking TXT records that contain API keys, verification tokens, or internal comments
Output Format
## DNS Enumeration Report **Target Domain**: example.com **Authorized Nameservers**: ns1.example.com (203.0.113.10), ns2.example.com (203.0.113.11) ### Zone Transfer Status | Nameserver | AXFR Result | Records Obtained | |------------|-------------|------------------| | ns1.example.com | REFUSED | 0 | | ns2.example.com | SUCCESS | 347 records | ### Subdomain Discovery Summary | Method | Subdomains Found | |--------|-----------------| | Zone Transfer | 347 | | Passive (subfinder + amass) | 89 | | Active Brute Force | 12 | | **Total Unique** | **412** | ### Critical Findings 1. **Zone Transfer Allowed** (High): ns2.example.com allows AXFR from any source 2. **Internal IP Disclosure** (Medium): 15 subdomains resolve to RFC1918 addresses 3. **Exposed Staging Environment** (High): staging.example.com accessible with default credentials 4. **Missing DMARC Policy** (Medium): No DMARC record found, enabling email spoofing 5. **Weak SPF Record** (Low): SPF uses ~all (soft fail) instead of -all (hard fail)