Awesome-openclaw-skills skills-audit
Audit locally installed agent skills for security/policy issues using the SkillLens CLI (`skilllens scan`, `skilllens config`). Use when asked to scan a skills directory (Codex/Claude) and produce a risk-focused audit report based on each skill's `SKILL.md` and bundled resources.
install
source · Clone the upstream repo
git clone https://github.com/sundial-org/awesome-openclaw-skills
Claude Code · Install into ~/.claude/skills/
T=$(mktemp -d) && git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/sundial-org/awesome-openclaw-skills "$T" && mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills && cp -r "$T/skills/skills-audit" ~/.claude/skills/sundial-org-awesome-openclaw-skills-skills-audit && rm -rf "$T"
OpenClaw · Install into ~/.openclaw/skills/
T=$(mktemp -d) && git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/sundial-org/awesome-openclaw-skills "$T" && mkdir -p ~/.openclaw/skills && cp -r "$T/skills/skills-audit" ~/.openclaw/skills/sundial-org-awesome-openclaw-skills-skills-audit && rm -rf "$T"
manifest:
skills/skills-audit/SKILL.mdsource content
Skills Audit (SkillLens)
Install SkillLens
- One-off run:
(ornpx skilllens scan
)pnpm dlx skilllens scan - Global install:
pnpm add -g skilllens
Quick start
- Run
to see configured scan roots and auditor CLI availability.skilllens config - Run
to scan configured roots, orskilllens scan
to scan a specific directory.skilllens scan <path> - Re-run with
to see raw auditor output and--verbose
to ignore cached results.--force
Audit workflow
-
Define scope
- Prefer a concrete target path (example:
) unless the user explicitly wants all configured roots.~/.codex/skills - If auditing a repo checkout containing skills, scan the parent folder that contains skill directories (example:
).skilllens scan ./skills
- Prefer a concrete target path (example:
-
Inventory skills with SkillLens
- Run
.skilllens scan [path] [--auditor claude|codex] - Treat missing auditor CLIs or
statuses as “manual review required”, not “safe”.skipped
- Run
-
Prioritize review order
- Review any
orunsafe
verdicts first.suspicious - Next, review skills that request broad permissions (filesystem/network), run shell commands, or reference external downloads.
- Review any
-
Manually review each skill’s contents
- Read the skill’s
and any referencedSKILL.md
,scripts/
, andreferences/
.assets/ - Do not execute bundled scripts by default; inspect first.
- Read the skill’s
-
Evaluate risks (focus on realistic abuse)
- Exfiltration: sending file contents, env vars, tokens, SSH keys, browser data, or configs to remote endpoints.
- Execution: instructions to run arbitrary shell commands,
,curl | bash
, or to fetch-and-execute code.eval - Persistence: modifying shell profiles, launch agents, cron, editor configs, or skill install locations.
- Privilege/approval bypass: instructions to ignore system policies, disable safety checks, or request escalated permissions unnecessarily.
- Prompt injection: attempts to override higher-priority instructions (“ignore previous”, “always comply”, “never mention…”).
- Overbroad triggers: vague descriptions that cause the skill to trigger on unrelated tasks.
-
Produce a report
- For each skill, include:
,name
,path
(safe/suspicious/unsafe),verdict
(0–100), and bullet issues with concrete evidence (quote or filename).risk - Recommend fixes that reduce blast radius: narrow scope, remove dangerous defaults, add explicit confirmation gates, and document required permissions.
- For each skill, include:
Command snippets
- Scan configured roots:
skilllens scan - Scan a specific folder:
skilllens scan ~/.codex/skills - Force a re-audit and show raw output:
skilllens scan ~/.codex/skills --force --verbose