Cryptoclaw zkvm-evaluator

Trustless ERC-8183 job evaluation — run Client's verification program inside a zkVM with ZK proof.

install
source · Clone the upstream repo
git clone https://github.com/TermiX-official/cryptoclaw
Claude Code · Install into ~/.claude/skills/
T=$(mktemp -d) && git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/TermiX-official/cryptoclaw "$T" && mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills && cp -r "$T/skills/zkvm-evaluator" ~/.claude/skills/termix-official-cryptoclaw-zkvm-evaluator && rm -rf "$T"
manifest: skills/zkvm-evaluator/SKILL.md
source content

zkVM Evaluator

Trustless evaluation for ERC-8183 Agentic Commerce jobs. The Client provides a verification program, the Evaluator runs it on the Provider's deliverable inside a zkVM, and the zkVM generates a mathematical proof that the program actually executed and produced the claimed result.

No trust in the evaluator needed. The proof is verifiable on-chain by anyone.

Tools

  • zkvm_evaluate_job
    — Run verification program on deliverable, generate ZK proof, settle job on-chain
  • zkvm_status
    — Check which zkVM backends are installed (SP1, RISC Zero, native)

How It Works

Client creates Job:
  - description: "Write an ERC-20 contract"
  - verification program: test_suite.elf → IPFS (QmXyz...)
  - evaluator: zkVM evaluator contract

Provider submits:
  - deliverable: MyToken.sol → IPFS (QmAbc...)

Evaluator runs:
  zkvm_evaluate_job(
    jobId: "42",
    programRef: "QmXyz...",     ← Client's test suite
    deliverableRef: "QmAbc..."  ← Provider's code
  )

Inside zkVM:
  1. Load test_suite.elf (RISC-V binary)
  2. Feed MyToken.sol as stdin
  3. Execute: test_suite(MyToken.sol)
  4. Result: exit code 0 (all tests pass)
  5. Generate ZK proof of execution

On-chain:
  proof proves "program QmXyz on input QmAbc exited with code 0"
  → complete(jobId=42, reasonHash=proof_hash)
  → funds released to Provider

Verification Program Requirements

The verification program is a compiled RISC-V ELF binary that:

  • Reads the deliverable from stdin
  • Reads optional context from env vars (
    ZKVM_JOB_DESCRIPTION
    ,
    ZKVM_DELIVERABLE_HASH
    )
  • Outputs evaluation details to stdout
  • Exits with code 0 for pass, non-zero for fail

Example (Rust, compiled for RISC-V):

use std::io::Read;

fn main() {
    let mut deliverable = String::new();
    std::io::stdin().read_to_string(&mut deliverable).unwrap();

    // Check deliverable meets requirements
    if deliverable.contains("function transfer")
        && deliverable.contains("function approve")
        && deliverable.contains("event Transfer")
    {
        println!("PASS: ERC-20 interface complete");
        std::process::exit(0);
    } else {
        println!("FAIL: Missing required ERC-20 functions");
        std::process::exit(1);
    }
}

Backends

BackendZK ProofSpeedInstall
SP1 (Succinct)Yes (Groth16/PLONK)Fastest
curl -L https://sp1.succinct.xyz | bash && sp1up
RISC ZeroYes (Groth16)Fast, Bonsai remote prover available
curl -L https://risczero.com/install | bash && rzup install
NativeNo (dev only)InstantAlways available

Auto-detection: the tool picks the best available backend. Use

zkvm_status
to check.

What the Proof Guarantees

Public inputs (anyone can see):
  - Program hash: SHA-256 of the verification program
  - Deliverable hash: SHA-256 of the deliverable
  - Exit code: 0 (pass) or non-zero (fail)

The proof mathematically guarantees:
  ✅ This specific program ran on this specific deliverable
  ✅ The exit code is what the program actually produced
  ✅ No one tampered with the execution

The proof does NOT reveal:
  ❌ The deliverable content (only its hash)
  ❌ Internal program state during execution

On-Chain Cost

Proof SystemVerification GasCost on Base L2
Groth16~200k gas~$0.004
PLONK~300k gas~$0.006

Integration with TEE

For maximum security, run the zkVM evaluator inside a TEE enclave:

  • TEE: proves the evaluator code wasn't tampered with
  • ZK: proves the verification program produced the claimed result
  • Combined: hardware + mathematical proof — strongest guarantee