Gsd-skill-creator compliance-governance
Provides compliance, governance, and supply chain security guidance for cloud-native systems. Covers OPA Rego policies, Kyverno cluster policies, SBOM generation, SLSA provenance, audit trail design, and regulatory framework mapping. Use when user mentions 'compliance', 'governance', 'OPA', 'kyverno', 'SBOM', 'SLSA', 'audit', 'policy-as-code', 'SOC2', 'HIPAA', 'PCI-DSS', 'artifact signing'.
git clone https://github.com/Tibsfox/gsd-skill-creator
T=$(mktemp -d) && git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/Tibsfox/gsd-skill-creator "$T" && mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills && cp -r "$T/examples/skills/patterns/compliance-governance" ~/.claude/skills/tibsfox-gsd-skill-creator-compliance-governance && rm -rf "$T"
examples/skills/patterns/compliance-governance/SKILL.mdCompliance and Governance
Best practices for implementing policy-as-code, supply chain security, audit trails, and regulatory compliance in cloud-native environments. This skill covers the full lifecycle from policy authoring to continuous compliance monitoring and evidence generation.
Regulatory Framework Comparison
Understanding which controls map to which framework prevents duplicate work and identifies gaps.
| Control Domain | SOC 2 (TSC) | HIPAA | PCI-DSS v4.0 | FedRAMP | ISO 27001 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Access Control | CC6.1-CC6.8 | 164.312(a) | Req 7, 8 | AC family | A.9 |
| Audit Logging | CC7.1-CC7.4 | 164.312(b) | Req 10 | AU family | A.12.4 |
| Encryption at Rest | CC6.1 | 164.312(a)(2)(iv) | Req 3 | SC-28 | A.10.1 |
| Encryption in Transit | CC6.7 | 164.312(e) | Req 4 | SC-8 | A.13.1 |
| Vulnerability Mgmt | CC7.1 | 164.308(a)(5)(ii) | Req 6, 11 | RA-5, SI-2 | A.12.6 |
| Incident Response | CC7.3-CC7.5 | 164.308(a)(6) | Req 12.10 | IR family | A.16 |
| Change Management | CC8.1 | 164.308(a)(5)(ii) | Req 6.5 | CM family | A.12.1 |
| Data Classification | CC6.5 | 164.312(d) | Req 3.2-3.4 | RA-2 | A.8.2 |
| Backup & Recovery | CC7.5, A1.2 | 164.308(a)(7) | Req 9.5 | CP family | A.12.3 |
| Vendor Management | CC9.2 | 164.308(b) | Req 12.8 | SA family | A.15 |
Framework Selection Guidance
| Your Industry | Start With | Add When Needed |
|---|---|---|
| SaaS B2B | SOC 2 Type II | ISO 27001 for international |
| Healthcare | HIPAA + SOC 2 | HITRUST for certification |
| E-commerce / Payments | PCI-DSS | SOC 2 for broader trust |
| Government / Defense | FedRAMP | NIST 800-171 for CUI |
| Finance | SOC 2 + PCI-DSS | SOX for public companies |
Policy-as-Code with OPA
Open Policy Agent (OPA) evaluates policies written in Rego against structured data. Policies are version-controlled, tested, and deployed alongside application code.
OPA Architecture
+------------------+ | Policy Bundle | | (Git repo) | +--------+---------+ | +--------v---------+ Request -------->| OPA Server |-------> Allow / Deny (JSON input) | (Rego engine) | + Reasons +--------+---------+ | +--------v---------+ | Decision Log | | (audit trail) | +------------------+
OPA Rego Policy: Kubernetes Admission Control
package kubernetes.admission import rego.v1 # Deny containers running as root deny contains msg if { input.request.kind.kind == "Pod" some container in input.request.object.spec.containers not container.securityContext.runAsNonRoot msg := sprintf( "Container '%s' in Pod '%s' must set securityContext.runAsNonRoot=true", [container.name, input.request.object.metadata.name] ) } # Deny images without digest pinning deny contains msg if { input.request.kind.kind == "Pod" some container in input.request.object.spec.containers not contains(container.image, "@sha256:") not startswith(container.image, "registry.internal.company.com/") msg := sprintf( "Container '%s' uses unpinned image '%s'. Pin with @sha256: digest.", [container.name, container.image] ) } # Require resource limits on all containers deny contains msg if { input.request.kind.kind == "Pod" some container in input.request.object.spec.containers not container.resources.limits.memory msg := sprintf( "Container '%s' must define resources.limits.memory", [container.name] ) } # Require labels for cost tracking deny contains msg if { input.request.kind.kind in {"Deployment", "StatefulSet", "DaemonSet"} not input.request.object.metadata.labels["cost-center"] msg := sprintf( "%s '%s' must have label 'cost-center' for cost allocation", [input.request.kind.kind, input.request.object.metadata.name] ) }
OPA Policy Testing
package kubernetes.admission_test import rego.v1 test_deny_root_container if { result := deny with input as { "request": { "kind": {"kind": "Pod"}, "object": { "metadata": {"name": "test-pod"}, "spec": { "containers": [{ "name": "app", "image": "nginx@sha256:abc123", "securityContext": {}, "resources": {"limits": {"memory": "128Mi"}} }] } } } } count(result) > 0 some msg in result contains(msg, "runAsNonRoot") } test_allow_nonroot_container if { result := deny with input as { "request": { "kind": {"kind": "Pod"}, "object": { "metadata": {"name": "test-pod"}, "spec": { "containers": [{ "name": "app", "image": "nginx@sha256:abc123", "securityContext": {"runAsNonRoot": true}, "resources": {"limits": {"memory": "128Mi"}} }] } } } } count(result) == 0 }
Policy-as-Code with Kyverno
Kyverno uses Kubernetes-native YAML for policies. No new language to learn.
Kyverno ClusterPolicy: Image Registry Restriction
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1 kind: ClusterPolicy metadata: name: restrict-image-registries annotations: policies.kyverno.io/title: Restrict Image Registries policies.kyverno.io/category: Supply Chain Security policies.kyverno.io/severity: high policies.kyverno.io/description: >- Only allow images from approved registries to prevent supply chain attacks via untrusted image sources. spec: validationFailureAction: Enforce background: true rules: - name: validate-registries match: any: - resources: kinds: - Pod validate: message: >- Image '{{ images.containers.*.registry }}' is not from an approved registry. Allowed: ghcr.io/our-org, registry.internal.company.com pattern: spec: containers: - image: "ghcr.io/our-org/* | registry.internal.company.com/*" =(initContainers): - image: "ghcr.io/our-org/* | registry.internal.company.com/*" - name: require-digest match: any: - resources: kinds: - Pod validate: message: "Images must use digest (@sha256:) not tags for reproducibility." pattern: spec: containers: - image: "*@sha256:*" - name: add-image-pull-secret match: any: - resources: kinds: - Pod mutate: patchStrategicMerge: spec: imagePullSecrets: - name: registry-credentials
OPA vs Kyverno Comparison
| Aspect | OPA / Gatekeeper | Kyverno |
|---|---|---|
| Policy Language | Rego (purpose-built) | YAML (K8s-native) |
| Learning Curve | Steep (new language) | Gentle (familiar YAML) |
| Mutation Support | Limited | First-class |
| Generation Support | No | Yes (create resources) |
| Image Verification | Via external data | Built-in (cosign/notary) |
| Audit Reports | Custom | Built-in PolicyReport |
| Multi-cluster | Bundle server | Shared policies via Git |
| Best For | Complex logic, multi-system | K8s-only, team adoption |
Supply Chain Security
SBOM Generation with Syft
A Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) catalogs every component in your software. Required by executive orders and increasingly by enterprise customers.
# Generate SBOM from container image syft ghcr.io/our-org/api:v1.2.3 -o spdx-json > sbom-api-v1.2.3.spdx.json # Generate SBOM from source directory syft dir:./src -o cyclonedx-json > sbom-source.cdx.json # Generate SBOM from Dockerfile syft docker:Dockerfile -o spdx-json > sbom-dockerfile.spdx.json # Scan SBOM for vulnerabilities with Grype grype sbom:./sbom-api-v1.2.3.spdx.json --fail-on high # CI integration: generate + scan + attest in one pipeline syft ghcr.io/our-org/api:v1.2.3 -o spdx-json | \ tee sbom.spdx.json | \ grype --fail-on critical
SBOM Format Comparison
| Aspect | SPDX | CycloneDX |
|---|---|---|
| Origin | Linux Foundation | OWASP |
| ISO Standard | ISO/IEC 5962:2021 | ECMA-424 |
| Primary Focus | Licensing + provenance | Security + dependencies |
| Gov. Requirement | US EO 14028 (preferred) | Widely accepted |
| Tooling | Broader ecosystem | Better vulnerability focus |
| Best For | License compliance | Security analysis |
SLSA Provenance
Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts (SLSA) provides a framework for ensuring artifact integrity.
| SLSA Level | Requirements | Trust |
|---|---|---|
| Level 0 | No guarantees | None |
| Level 1 | Build process documented | Provenance exists |
| Level 2 | Hosted build, signed provenance | Tamper-resistant provenance |
| Level 3 | Hardened build platform | Tamper-proof provenance |
SLSA Provenance with GitHub Actions
name: Release with SLSA Provenance on: push: tags: ['v*'] permissions: contents: write packages: write id-token: write # OIDC for keyless signing attestations: write # GitHub artifact attestations jobs: build: runs-on: ubuntu-latest outputs: digest: ${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }} steps: - uses: actions/checkout@v4 - uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3 - uses: docker/login-action@v3 with: registry: ghcr.io username: ${{ github.actor }} password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} - name: Build and push id: build uses: docker/build-push-action@v6 with: context: . push: true tags: ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}:${{ github.ref_name }} - name: Generate SBOM uses: anchore/sbom-action@v0 with: image: ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}:${{ github.ref_name }} format: spdx-json output-file: sbom.spdx.json - name: Attest SBOM uses: actions/attest-sbom@v2 with: subject-name: ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }} subject-digest: ${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }} sbom-path: sbom.spdx.json - name: Attest build provenance uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@v2 with: subject-name: ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }} subject-digest: ${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}
Artifact Signing with Cosign
# Install cosign go install github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2/cmd/cosign@latest # Keyless signing (recommended -- uses OIDC identity) cosign sign ghcr.io/our-org/api@sha256:abc123def456 # Verify signature cosign verify ghcr.io/our-org/api@sha256:abc123def456 \ --certificate-identity=https://github.com/our-org/api/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/v1.2.3 \ --certificate-oidc-issuer=https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com # Sign with key pair (for air-gapped environments) cosign generate-key-pair cosign sign --key cosign.key ghcr.io/our-org/api@sha256:abc123def456 cosign verify --key cosign.pub ghcr.io/our-org/api@sha256:abc123def456 # Attach SBOM as attestation cosign attest --predicate sbom.spdx.json \ --type spdxjson \ ghcr.io/our-org/api@sha256:abc123def456
Audit Trail Architecture
Every compliance framework requires audit logging. Design for immutability and completeness.
Audit Event Schema
{ "event_id": "uuid-v7", "timestamp": "2025-03-15T14:30:00.000Z", "actor": { "type": "user|service|system", "id": "user-123", "ip": "10.0.1.50", "session_id": "sess-abc" }, "action": { "type": "create|read|update|delete|login|export|approve", "resource": "patient-record", "resource_id": "rec-456" }, "context": { "service": "api-gateway", "environment": "production", "request_id": "req-789", "correlation_id": "corr-012" }, "outcome": { "status": "success|failure|denied", "reason": "insufficient_permissions", "policy_violated": "rbac-admin-only" }, "changes": { "before": {"status": "active"}, "after": {"status": "suspended"} }, "metadata": { "compliance_scope": ["hipaa", "soc2"], "data_classification": "pii", "retention_days": 2555 } }
Audit Trail Pipeline
Application --> Structured Log --> Log Aggregator --> Immutable Store | | | v v v stdout/ Fluentd/Vector S3 (WORM) + event bus with schema CloudTrail validation Lake | v SIEM / Query (Athena, Splunk, Elastic)
Retention Requirements by Framework
| Framework | Minimum Retention | Recommended | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| SOC 2 | 1 year | 3 years | Auditor needs rolling 12 months |
| HIPAA | 6 years | 7 years | From date of creation or last effective date |
| PCI-DSS | 1 year | 3 years | Immediate access to 3 months |
| FedRAMP | 3 years | 6 years | May vary by data classification |
| GDPR | No minimum | Case-by-case | Must justify retention period |
RBAC and Access Control
Kubernetes RBAC Policy
# Principle: least privilege, namespace-scoped, no wildcard verbs apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 kind: Role metadata: name: app-developer namespace: team-alpha rules: - apiGroups: ["apps"] resources: ["deployments", "replicasets"] verbs: ["get", "list", "watch", "create", "update", "patch"] - apiGroups: [""] resources: ["pods", "pods/log", "services", "configmaps"] verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"] # Explicitly NO access to: secrets, persistent volumes, cluster roles --- apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 kind: RoleBinding metadata: name: app-developer-binding namespace: team-alpha subjects: - kind: Group name: team-alpha-devs apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io roleRef: kind: Role name: app-developer apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
Access Control Comparison
| Model | When to Use | Complexity | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| RBAC | Standard team structures | Low | Developer, Admin, Viewer roles |
| ABAC | Dynamic, attribute-driven | Medium | "Allow if department=engineering AND env=staging" |
| ReBAC | Relationship-heavy domains | High | "Allow if user is owner of parent folder" |
| PBAC | Compliance-driven | Medium | OPA/Cedar policies |
Policy-as-Code Workflow
Author Policy --> Unit Test --> Review PR --> Merge --> Deploy to OPA/Kyverno | | | | | v v v v v Rego/YAML opa test Peer + Main Gatekeeper in Git conftest Security branch admission review controller | v Audit + Alert on violations
CI Pipeline for Policy Testing
name: Policy CI on: pull_request: paths: - 'policies/**' jobs: test-opa: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - uses: actions/checkout@v4 - name: Install OPA run: | curl -L -o opa https://openpolicyagent.org/downloads/latest/opa_linux_amd64_static chmod +x opa && sudo mv opa /usr/local/bin/ - name: Run policy unit tests run: opa test policies/ -v - name: Check policy formatting run: opa fmt --diff policies/ - name: Validate against sample resources run: | for fixture in test-fixtures/*.json; do echo "Testing: $fixture" opa eval -i "$fixture" -d policies/ "data.kubernetes.admission.deny" \ --format pretty done test-kyverno: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - uses: actions/checkout@v4 - name: Install Kyverno CLI run: | curl -LO https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/releases/latest/download/kyverno-cli_linux_x86_64.tar.gz tar xzf kyverno-cli_linux_x86_64.tar.gz sudo mv kyverno /usr/local/bin/ - name: Test Kyverno policies run: kyverno test policies/kyverno/tests/
Anti-Patterns
| Anti-Pattern | Problem | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| Manual compliance checks | Inconsistent, unscalable, audit failures | Automate with OPA/Kyverno in admission control |
| Policies in wikis, not code | Drift between docs and enforcement | Policy-as-code in Git with CI testing |
with wildcard verbs | Grants full cluster access, violates least privilege | Namespace-scoped Roles with explicit verb lists |
| SBOM generated once, never updated | Stale dependency data, missed CVEs | Generate SBOM on every build, scan continuously |
| Audit logs in application database | Mutable, deletable, single point of failure | Write-once storage (S3 Object Lock, immutable volumes) |
| Tag-based image references | Mutable tags allow supply chain attacks | Pin images by digest |
| Unsigned artifacts in production | No provenance, no tamper detection | Sign with cosign, verify in admission control |
| "We'll add compliance later" | Retrofit is 10x more expensive | Build compliance controls into CI from day one |
| Single compliance framework mapping | Duplicate control implementations | Map controls across frameworks (unified control matrix) |
| No policy dry-run before enforce | Policies break production workloads | Use mode first, review PolicyReport, then |
| Shared service accounts across teams | No accountability, impossible to audit | Per-team service accounts with scoped permissions |
| Storing secrets in ConfigMaps | ConfigMaps are not encrypted at rest | Use Secrets with encryption, or external secret managers |
| No evidence collection automation | Scramble before audits, missing proof | Automate evidence gathering with scheduled jobs |
Compliance Automation Checklist
- Policy-as-code repository established with CI/CD pipeline
- OPA or Kyverno deployed as admission controller in all clusters
- Policies run in audit mode before enforcement
- SBOM generated on every container build
- SBOM scanned for vulnerabilities with severity thresholds
- Artifacts signed with cosign (keyless via OIDC preferred)
- Signature verification enforced in admission control
- Audit logs written to immutable storage (WORM/Object Lock)
- Audit log retention meets framework requirements
- RBAC follows least privilege (no wildcard verbs, namespace-scoped)
- Service accounts scoped per team/application
- Regulatory control matrix maintained mapping controls across frameworks
- Evidence collection automated for audit preparation
- SLSA Level 2+ achieved for production artifacts
- Policy test coverage tracked (aim for >90%)
- Compliance dashboard with real-time violation metrics
- Incident response runbook includes compliance notification procedures
- Third-party dependencies reviewed for license compliance
- Data classification labels applied to all storage resources
- Access reviews scheduled quarterly with automated reports