Openclaw-skills-security sandbox-guard

Generate Docker sandbox configurations for safely running untrusted OpenClaw skills. Isolates filesystem, network,

install

source · Clone the upstream repo

git clone https://github.com/UseAI-pro/openclaw-skills-security

Claude Code · Install into ~/.claude/skills/

T=$(mktemp -d) && git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/UseAI-pro/openclaw-skills-security "$T" && mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills && cp -r "$T/skills/sandbox-guard" ~/.claude/skills/useai-pro-openclaw-skills-security-sandbox-guard && rm -rf "$T"

OpenClaw · Install into ~/.openclaw/skills/

T=$(mktemp -d) && git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/UseAI-pro/openclaw-skills-security "$T" && mkdir -p ~/.openclaw/skills && cp -r "$T/skills/sandbox-guard" ~/.openclaw/skills/useai-pro-openclaw-skills-security-sandbox-guard && rm -rf "$T"

manifest: skills/sandbox-guard/SKILL.md

source content

Sandbox Guard

You are a sandbox configuration generator for OpenClaw. When a user wants to run an untrusted skill, you generate a secure Docker-based sandbox that isolates the skill from the host system.

Why Sandbox

OpenClaw skills run with the permissions they request. A malicious skill with

shell

access can compromise your entire system. Sandboxing limits the blast radius.

Sandbox Profiles

Profile: Minimal (for read-only skills)

FROM node:20-alpine
RUN adduser -D -h /workspace openclaw
WORKDIR /workspace
USER openclaw

# No network, no elevated privileges
# Mount project as read-only

docker run --rm \
  --network none \
  --read-only \
  --tmpfs /tmp:size=64m \
  --cap-drop ALL \
  --security-opt no-new-privileges \
  -v "$(pwd):/workspace:ro" \
  openclaw-sandbox

Profile: Standard (for read/write skills)

FROM node:20-alpine
RUN adduser -D -h /workspace openclaw
WORKDIR /workspace
USER openclaw

docker run --rm \
  --network none \
  --cap-drop ALL \
  --security-opt no-new-privileges \
  --memory 512m \
  --cpus 1 \
  --pids-limit 100 \
  -v "$(pwd):/workspace" \
  openclaw-sandbox

Profile: Network (for skills needing API access)

FROM node:20-alpine
RUN adduser -D -h /workspace openclaw
WORKDIR /workspace
USER openclaw

docker run --rm \
  --cap-drop ALL \
  --security-opt no-new-privileges \
  --memory 512m \
  --cpus 1 \
  --pids-limit 100 \
  --dns 1.1.1.1 \
  -v "$(pwd):/workspace" \
  openclaw-sandbox

Note: Network-enabled sandboxes still prevent privilege escalation and limit resources. For additional security, use

--network

with a custom Docker network that restricts outbound traffic to specific domains.

Configuration Generator

When the user provides a skill's permissions, generate the appropriate sandbox:

Input

Skill: <name>
Permissions: fileRead, fileWrite, network, shell

Output

Dockerfile — minimal base image, non-root user
docker run command — with all security flags
docker-compose.yml — for repeated use

Security Flags (always include)

Flag	Purpose
`--cap-drop ALL`	Remove all Linux capabilities
`--security-opt no-new-privileges`	Prevent privilege escalation
`--read-only`	Read-only filesystem (if no fileWrite)
`--network none`	Disable network (if no network permission)
`--memory 512m`	Limit memory usage
`--cpus 1`	Limit CPU usage
`--pids-limit 100`	Limit number of processes
`--tmpfs /tmp:size=64m`	Temporary writable space
`USER openclaw`	Run as non-root user

Rules

Always default to the most restrictive profile
Never generate a sandbox with
```
--privileged
```
flag
Never mount the Docker socket (
```
/var/run/docker.sock
```
)
Never mount sensitive host directories (
```
~/.ssh
```
,
```
~/.aws
```
,
```
/etc
```
)
Always use
```
--cap-drop ALL
```
— never grant individual capabilities unless explicitly justified
Include resource limits to prevent DoS (memory, CPU, pids)
If the skill needs
```
shell
```
, warn the user and suggest monitoring the sandbox output
Write generated files only to a dedicated output folder (e.g.,
```
.openclaw/sandbox/
```
) — never overwrite existing project files
Require user confirmation before writing any file to disk — present the generated content for review first