Vibecosystem config-security-scan
Scan .claude/ directory for security misconfigurations, exposed secrets, unsafe permissions
install
source · Clone the upstream repo
git clone https://github.com/vibeeval/vibecosystem
Claude Code · Install into ~/.claude/skills/
T=$(mktemp -d) && git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/vibeeval/vibecosystem "$T" && mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills && cp -r "$T/skills/config-security-scan" ~/.claude/skills/vibeeval-vibecosystem-config-security-scan && rm -rf "$T"
manifest:
skills/config-security-scan/SKILL.mdsource content
Config Security Scan
Scan your
.claude/ directory and related configuration files for security issues. Inspired by AgentShield pattern - checks CLAUDE.md, settings.json, MCP configs, hooks, and agent definitions for misconfigurations, exposed secrets, and unsafe permissions.
Usage
/config-security-scan [path]
Default path:
.claude/ in current project.
What It Checks
1. Secrets Detection (CRITICAL)
- API keys, tokens, passwords in CLAUDE.md - Hardcoded credentials in hook scripts - Secrets in MCP server configs - Bearer tokens in agent definitions - .env files committed to git
2. Permission Escalation (HIGH)
- dangerouslySkipPermissions in settings.json - Overly broad tool permissions (all tools for simple agents) - MCP servers with filesystem write access - Hooks with shell execution and no validation - Agents with Bash tool that don't need it
3. MCP Server Security (HIGH)
- Unknown/untrusted MCP servers - MCP servers with network access + filesystem access - Missing authentication on MCP endpoints - MCP servers running as root/admin - Unverified npm packages in MCP configs
4. Hook Security (MEDIUM)
- Hooks that execute user input - Hooks without error handling - Hooks that modify git config - Hooks that access external networks - Hooks with hardcoded paths
5. Agent Definition Security (MEDIUM)
- Agents with unnecessary tools - Agents with system-level Bash access - Agent descriptions that could enable prompt injection - Agents without clear scope boundaries
6. Configuration Hygiene (LOW)
- Unused MCP server configs - Deprecated settings - Conflicting rules - Missing recommended security settings
Scan Procedure
# Step 1: Find all config files find .claude/ -type f \( -name "*.json" -o -name "*.md" -o -name "*.yml" -o -name "*.yaml" -o -name "*.js" -o -name "*.mjs" -o -name "*.ts" \) # Step 2: Secret patterns grep -rn "api[_-]?key\|password\|secret\|token\|bearer\|sk-\|pk_\|ghp_\|gho_\|xoxb-\|xoxp-" .claude/ # Step 3: Permission checks grep -rn "dangerouslySkipPermissions\|allowedTools.*Bash\|shell_exec\|eval(" .claude/ # Step 4: MCP config review cat .mcp.json 2>/dev/null | jq '.mcpServers | keys' # Step 5: Hook review ls .claude/hooks/ 2>/dev/null
Output Format
# Config Security Scan Report Scanned: [path] Date: [timestamp] ## Summary - CRITICAL: X issues - HIGH: Y issues - MEDIUM: Z issues - LOW: W issues ## CRITICAL Issues ### [Issue Title] **File:** [path] **Line:** [number] **Issue:** [description] **Fix:** [remediation] ## Recommendations 1. [Action item]
Hard Exclusion List (Skip These)
These are NOT security issues in the .claude/ context:
- Environment variable references (not actual values)
- Test/example credentials clearly marked as such
- Public API keys meant to be public
- SHA hashes used as identifiers
- Base64-encoded non-secret data
- localhost/127.0.0.1 URLs
Integration
- security-reviewer: Calls this skill during security audits
- verifier: Includes config scan in pre-commit checks
- shipper: Runs before deployments